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WAR AS METAPHOR·AND·THE RULE. OF-LAW
IN CRISIS: THE LESSONS WE SHOULD HAVE
LE
ED FROM THEWAR ON DRUGS
Susan Stuart*
•

I. INTRODUCTION
•

The recent assassination attempt against Congresswoman Gabrielle
1
Giffords and the murder of a federal judge prompted a corollary discussion
about the manifestation of political rhetoric, a war of words about words.
The discussion, which strayed from sincere concern to inexplicable illogic
at times, posed the not-surprising question: Did the hyperbole of
2
conservative politicians and pundits precipitate the attack?
Given
Loughner's mental instability, any direct link between specific exhortations
of politicians and pundits and his acts is highly problematic. However, we .
cannot stop the discussion about the responsibility for Loughner's acts by
ass"Qllling the intervening causation of his mental state cuts off
responsibility, for doing so ignores the larger discussion about the use of
militarized rhetoric and its effect on the behavior of others. Furthermore,
that larger discussion must embrace what that rhetoric is doing· to this
country's fundamental democratic principles, especially the rule of law .
Rhetoric
has
long
been
employed
to
persuade,
even
goad,
people
to
.
action. _Speakers use powerful words and images to persuade people to sell
a product, to vote for a candidate, to encourage collective action, to
propagandize a political message, or to follow a religious creed. Rhetoric is
fundamental to the movement of people, to the indoctrination of the crowd.
Powerful rhetoric indeed was required to persuade a reluctant and loosely
affiliated group of colonists to rebel against the most powerful country on
earth to fortn a union of states that would protect the right to engage in that
rhetoric. However, the problem posed by much of today's rhetoric on
3
both sides of the political spectrum although primarily on the right is that
0

•

•
1.

2.
•

3.

Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A., DePauw University; M.Ed., Valparaiso
University; J.D., Indiana University-Indianapolis.
See, e.g., Marc Lacey & David M. Herszenhom, In Attack's Wake, Political Repercussions, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011., http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/0l/09/us/politicsl09giffords.html.
See, e.g., Brian Montopoli & Robert Hendin, Sarah Palin Criticized over Gabrielle Giffords[1
Presence on _.Target List," CBSNEWS, Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301·
503544- 162-20027918-503544.html.
The current militarized rhetoric tends to originate from the right; the left uses it defensively:

1

•

.

•
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public policy discussions are no longer couched in the pragmatic rhetoric
concerning the merits of ideas or solutions to problems facing the country.
Instead,. that rhetoric is couched in terms of war.
.
Such militaristic rhetoric has become increasingly common in
advancing public policy agendas, perhaps most notably evolving with Cold
4
War rhetoric in foreign policy. More troubling has become the use of war
5
rhetoric "to elicit public consent for all sorts of disparate ventures.'' For
instance, President ~yodon B. Johnson's War on Poverty was waged in the
1960s to gain support for sweeping civil rights- refonns. The Cold War
eventually resolved itself with the collapse of the· Soviet Union, while the
War on Poverty effected significant civil rights legislation., Both so-called
wars, not real wars but causes deemed to be just, were resolved favorably to
the United States and thereby confirtned the efficacy of militaristic rhetoric.
At the time, therefore, the use of such rhetoric seemed justified, not
problematic. World War II was the very recent past, and we assumed the
public understood the distinction between the rhetoric's metaphorical use in
public policy positions and its literal use. We were, after all, still engaged
in actual military operations in Korea and Vietnam during the 1950s and
1960s. We thought we recognized that militaristic rhetoric was a marketing
ploy'(pathos) to sell the logic of foreign policy and of social policy (logos).
Especially with regard to social policy, we recognized that the militarized
rhetoric was a metaphor for the struggle
with
an.
abstraction
civil
rights
.
and poverty. Although violence was an unfortunate outgrowth of the civil
rights movement, Pres~dent Johnson's rhetoric was not a declaration of war
against a literal enemy·. However, today's increasing use of militaristic
rhetoric by politicians and pundits goes beyond its metaphorical use as a
war against an abstraction. Instead, the use of such language is becoming
•

•

•

Americans tend to toss the_word ''war" around carelessly[.) . . . [T]he term "cultural
war'' was appropriated by neo-conservative intellectuals from the German tenn
"Kulturkampf," which referred to Bismarck's campaign against the Roman Catholic
Church in Germany in the 1870s and which suggests a Prussian harshness. Other parts
of the social and political spectrum in the United States also use the tenn; at least in
self-defense.
James F. Childress, The War Metaphor in Public Policy: Some Moral Reflections, in DIE
LEADER'S IMPERATIVE: ETHICS, INTEGRITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY

4.

5.

181, 193 (J.C. Ficarotta ed.,

Purdue e.-Pubs 2.001), available at http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/press_ebooks/7.
David Hoogland Noon, Operation Enduring Analogy: World War JL the War on Terror, and the
Uses ofHistori.cal Memory, 7 RHETORIC & PuB. AFFAIRS 339, 342 (2004). "The swift transfer of
military language (not to mention production) from World War II to the Cold War during the
1940s represents only the most portentous example of the tendency for policymakers to imagine
the nation in the midst of a perpetual war~" !d.
/d.

•
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literal, and that rhetorical shift .matters. Today's militaristic rhetoric is
increasingly identifying fellow citizens as enemies in a literal war.
The homology of literal war rhetoric and metaphorical war rhetoric
arises from a potent source. In the modern United States, military images
have extraordinary persuasive value:

•

•

Collective memory of war, more than any other genre of historical
experience, has been central to the public culture of the modem United
States as well as to the commercial realm of historical memory. Popular
memories of war not only claim to preserve some heroic moment of the
past, but they often make acute demands upon the living, who must
periodically show themselves worthy of the gifts bestowed upon them by
6
the wartime sacrifices of others.

At some point, however, we have crossed the line from the .marketing use
of the metaphorical militarization to actual militarization. Somewhere in
the last thirty or forty years, we have found it too· easy to use militarized
rhetoric without examining its consequences. Nowhere is that easy usage
more apparent than in the War on Drugs, especially as it relates to children.
What happened to children in the War on Drugs may even be part of the
reason why our current public discourse is reaching a crisis point: · A war
against an abstraction found an enemy a defenseless enemy and
fundamentally changed the ~le of law to make engaging that enemy much·
•
easter.
At its inception, the War on Drugs had a public policy logos to market
by its military pathos: The United States had a problem dealing with drug
abuse when the War was declared. Hence, the War did not start as an end
in and of itself. It was merely the means to curbing an abstract problem,
not unlike the War on Poverty. Its militarized rhetoric did not start out as
anything but a rhetorical ploy in changing public perception and therefore
public policy. From the successes of that marketing strategy has emerged
the new militarized rhetoric that has moved the metaphorical to the literaL
Unfortunately, these renewed strategies seem utterly oblivious to the
consequences of the abysmal failure that is the War on Drugs.
Furthennore, the rhetoric of the War on Drugs has inured us to the moral
implications of using such rhetoric and the personal responsibility that
should go with it. Without that moral awareness, the new militarized
rhetoric is much more dangerous as it becomes less metaphorical and more
literal.
Thus, the thesis of this article is that the larger marketing strategy of
public policy through militarized rhetoric does have consequences because,
•

•

•

•

6.

•

/d.

•
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· . ultimately, a specific eneiny may be engaged and war-time exigencies may
suspend the rule of law. Worse, we may have changed our schools into
institutions where we teach children that militarized rhetoric is acceptable·
and without moral consequence. Part I describes the militarization of the
War on Drugs and how and why the U.S. goverrunent's marketing strategy
was first employed. Turning schools into literal battlegrounds in the War
on Drugs is the subject of Part II. That analysis will examine how all three
branches of government actually enabled the War on Drugs. by· both
identifying children as enemies and legally justifying the war against them.
Part III ·then explores the "Americanization" philosophy of the War, a
philosophy that has not only contributed to the longevity of the War and
turned public schoolchildren into the enemy but also acted as the
abstraction that fonned the basis of today's militarized rhetoric in the
Culture War by painting the War as an ''us-versus-them"-style struggle.
Part IV then identifies the War on Drugs as one of the direct sources of
today~s hyper-militarized rhetoric in which war is both the means and the
end of the marketing strategy and opines that that War deafened Americans
to the moral implications of war ~ metaphor so that we now do have actual
war among citizens of this country, the consequence of which ·may be a
fundamental change in the rule of la~.
•

II. SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES
•

7

• •

The War on Drugs against children, teenagers in particular, has lasted
longer than the reigns of the Roman Emperors Caligula through Nero. It
did not start out as a war against teenagers, at least not explicitly. Rather, it
started out as a way of scape-goating others for institutional failures and,
ironically, as a backlash against President Johnson's War on Poverty and
his civil rights successes in the 1960s. Nonetheless, teenagers got caught in
the crossfrre. They were the natural enemy in this War because it
demanded complete obeisance to authority and subjugation to forces of
unreasonable fear. However, the normal teenager is not wired to do either
so the battle was joined.
•

•

7.

RAY BRADBURY, SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES (1962); see a/so WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 2, sc. 1. Bradbury's novel is a coming-of-age story of two thirteen-

year-old boys reaching the gateway to maturity. one who reflects the brighter, trusting childhood
side of that portal and the other, the darker, riskier adulthood side. Both are faced with decisions
that can change their adolescence when a carnival comes to town that invites yet repels them with
the Mephistophelean promise: they can grow up instantly by riding the carousel forward. Adults,
on the other hand, are lured with the promise of renewed youth by riding the carousel backwards.
The carnival feeds off people's fear, "living off the poison of the sins we do each other~ and the
feunent of our most terrible regrets." BRADBURY, supra, at 203.

•

•

2011]

•

War as Metaphor

5

•
•

•

•

The War on Drugs, declared by President Richard Nixon in the early
1970s, indeed was and is a war insofar as, these days, U.S. citizens are
persuaded that we are at war with any enemy that might threaten or has
threatened the polity. When U.S. citizens are frightened enough to envision
any number of harms that such an enemy might cause, then, of course, we
must be mobilized to fight that enemy. Citizens of this country tend not to
carefully analyze those claims so long as we are frightened sufficiently by
those we are supposed to trust and in whom we have imposed the trust of
our national safety and security. War also tends to make us want to
embrace a national unity, just as we did in World War II. Thus, we
breathlessly await our marching orders to combat the enemy or, at the very
least, take pre-emptive measures to make sure the enemy will not breach
this nation's defenses. We as a people tend not to be very reflective about
the truth underlying those claims or the wisdom of the actions we are asked
8
to take because war "is an enticing elixir."
·
The U.S. goverruttent's War on Drugs arose out of an actual, albeit
over-hyped, need to solve problems posed by drug use and abuse in this
country. This article is not intended to give short shrift to the harms caused
by drug use, especially addiction, or to its ancillary impact on crime,· both
violent and opportunistic. Nor is the article intended to give short shrift to
the government's original goal of twinning treatment with law enforcement
because, at the outset, the War on Drugs actually did emphasize the need to·
fund treatment. But forty years later, the incessant drumbeat of war has ·
sidelined the treatment, and hence the preventive, effort to combat drug
abuse and has instead focused on a militaristic approach that has .driven the
War on Drugs into and through the nation's schools and has riven
·constitutional protections from children. Unfortunately, · that driving
impulse only thrived when the government implicitly framed the War as a
struggle between good and evil for the soul of a nation and explicitly
framed the War to play on the people's fears. This rhetorical use was also a
ploy to divert the people's attention from the ravages of Vietnam to their
Puritanical national self-image of being clean in body and mind.
The love-hate relationship between non-medical drug use and the
9
United States government has existed since the founding of the Republic.
As a new type of ingestible vice has been discovere~, the goverrunent has

•

3 (2002). "The enduring attraction of

8.

CHRIS HEDGES, WAR Is A FORCE THAT GIVES Us MEANING

9.

war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can
give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living." /d.
See generally Elaine Casey, History of Drug Use and Drug Users in the United States. THE
NAT'L
DRUG
ABUSE
CTR.
FOR
TRAINING
REs. &
DEV.
{Nov.
1978),
http://www .druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/CASEY l.htm.
.
•

•
•

•

•
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reacted to inhibit its use, from alcohol and.to·bac·co to hemp ·and opiates.
Early U.S. drug control efforts derived, for the most part, from a concern
about the banns of overdosing on opiates, particularly the concern that
citizens would misuse them without understanding their lethal tendencies or
11
that people might even be drawn to them for cottunitting suicide. But just
as surely as the government wanted to exercise its parens patriae role to
protect citizens from hartn, private social forces wanted to protect citizens
from themselves
and
their
tendencies
to
overindulge
in
pleasure.
Indeed,
.
Prohibition was one of the more remarkable efforts by the government to
· prevent citizens from indulging in a particular type of controlled substance
12
·on such paired impulses of sparing citizens both harm and pleasure.
These two controlling visions of the government's role in
Prohibition and which implicitly informed the War on Drugs might be
attributable to any number of forces, on either end of the political spectrum.
Both religious conservatives and progressives were driving forces behind
protecti~g citizens from the harms of abusing alcohol essentially a
13
vi~timless vice.
Interwoven throughout those visions is the U.S.'s
Puritanical cultural tendency to control how others live and the underlying
14
intolerance of those who do not ascribe to nor submit to that control.
Prohibition's spectacular failure in protecting citizens from themselves
presaged the problems that were systemic in the War on Drugs, posing
similar issues of social and cultural control and intolerance.
Those social and cultural impulses go a long way toward explaining
why drug addiction, whether recreational or medical, has long been
deplored in the United States. Opium and morphine were readily available
for purchase over the counter in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but those who overindulged "opium drunkards" were
15
derided. These drug prohibition efforts carne to a head after the Spanish10

•

•

.

•

•

See generally The 'Lectric Law Librruy, A History of Drog Use and Prohibition,
http://www.lectlaw.com/files/drg09.htm; 'DIOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE
· RITuAL PERSECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS & PUSHERS, 183-212 (appx) (1974).
11. David F. Musto, M.D., History of Legislative Control over Opium, Cocaine, and Their
Derivatives,
SHAFFER
LmR.
OF
DRUG
POL'Y,
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/ophs.htm.
12. See, e.g., Casey, supra note 9; RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT:
l 0.

•

13.

14.

15.

TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, 19-20 (1995).
ANDREW SINCLAIR, PROHffiiTION: THE ERA OF EXCESS, 91-94 (1962). That is not

to say that
alcohol abuse does hot hann parties other than the drinker. However, the philosophical
underpinnings for the early anti-drinking efforts targeted the individual's consumption rather than
its consequences to others. /d.
See, e.g., JAMES MORONE, HELLFIRE NATION: THE POLITICS OF SIN IN AMERICAN HISTORY 9899, 494-97 (2003). Ironically, colonial Puritans did not oppose drinking alcohol. Jd. at 284
(alcohol was the "goodly creature of God"); HAMM, supra note 12, at 34-35.
Musto, supra note 11.

•

.
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Ainerican War when the United States took control of the. Philippines.,
There, the government was confronted with a local, nonmedical opium
16
market condemned by local missionaries.
The ·goverrmtent opted for .
•

17

prohibition.
Notwithstanding modem variations of prohibition as a .drug control
18
tactic, recreational drug use exploded in the 1960s and went mainstream.
Concerned by this explosion in illicit drug use, President Lyndon Johnson
created the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control, the precursor to the Drug
19
Enforcement Administration.
Simultaneously, the government made
20
special efforts to ·cut off the rising marijuana trade from Mexico. - By
1970, Congress had passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
21
Control Act. That legislation combined more than fifty pieces of disparate
federal drug laws into one comprehensive act with a single system for
22
controlling narcotics and psychotropics and provided for both criminal
enforcement and drug treatment. When signing the Act into law, President
Richard Nixon remarked on the need to "cure" drug addiction while at the
same time addressing the need to add three hundred more law enforcement
23
agents. '.'But sensationalism rather than rationality, ... guided the national
24
conversation',' about drugs.
·
In 1971., a report on heroin addiction among U.S. servicemen in
25
Vietnam which later proved to be wildly inaccurate was_released.
•

16.
17.
18.
19.

/d.

The prohibition movement against drugs was contemporaneous with the ternperance and antisaloon movements against alcohol. Id.
Frontline: Drug Wars, Thirty Years ofAmerica's Drug War, A Chronology, PBS.ORG (Oct. 2000),
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pageslfrontlinelshows/ drugs/cron/.
U.S.
Drug
Enforcement
Admin.,1970-1975,
http://www.justice.gov/dea/
pubs/history/deahistory- Ol.htm. The DEA is the "offspring" of the Bureau of Prohibition, an
agency of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Id.
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat.
1242 (1970); Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
DEA 197(}...1975, supra note 19~
.
President Richard Nixon, Remarks on Signing_the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control
Act
of
1970
(Oct.
27,
1970),
available
at
http://www.·presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2767.
BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE WRONG
.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.

.

•

TIJINGS: CRIME, DRUGS, MINORITIES, TEEN MOMS, KILLER KIDS, MUTANT MICROBES, PLANE

131 (Basic Books 1999).
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18; MORGAN F. MURPHY & ROBERT H. STEELE, THE WORLD
HEROIN PROBLEM: REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION, H.R. REP. NO. 92-298 (June 22, 1971),
available at www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/239/ 2391101003A.pdf. This House Report turns
out to have grossly exaggerated troop heroin usage in Vietnam at 10-15%. !d. at 1. One of the
Report's authors, Congressman Robert H. Steele, later recanted his representations, opining that
servicemen'sheroin usage was more likely only 5%; one-half to one-third of the original estimate.
That recantation was borne out by the results of Operation Golden Flow, a urinalysis program
imposed on returning servicetnen that yielded only a 4.5% positive result for drug use. Jeremy
CRASHES, ROAD RAGE, & So MUCH MORE,

25.

•
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Now President Nixon had a national security issue to which he could tie his
anti-drug efforts. A month after the report's release, the President took his
first war-like stance against drugs in a press conference on June 17, 1971:
"America's public enemy number one in the United States is drug abuse. In
order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to wage a new, all-out
26
offensive." His· employment of war analogies was clearly no accident and
27
was a theme he used regardless of his audience throughout the remainder
28
of his presidency, although the phrase "war on drugs" did not become the
29
coin of the realm until September 22, 1972. By March 1973, Nixon had
crafted the DEA, exhorting Congress that "[t]his Administration has
declared all-out, global war on the drug menace. As I reported to the
Congress earlier this month in my State of the Union message, there is
30
evidence of significant progress on a number of fronts in that war." By
that time, Nixon's drug treatment agenda was no longer in evidence; only
the criminal enforcement agenda had the President's and the country's
attention.
Beyond Nixon's war-like rhetoric, "War on Drugs" really did not
.become the brand name \l~til succeeding presidencies. Confining oneself to
a ·simple search of officially recorded statements. from the American
Presidency Project, one finds that President Geralr;l Ford in a much shorter
presidency than Nixon's us~d the term in at least three official
•

•

•

26.

•

27.

Kuzmarov, From Counter-Insurgency to Narco-Jnsurgency: Vietnam and the International War
on Drugs, 20 J. OF POL'Y HIST. 344,353 (2008); See also Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
President Richard Nixon, Remarks to the American People about an Intensified Program for Drug
Abuse
Prevention
and
Control
(June
17,
1971 ),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3047; see also President Richard Nixon,
Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971),
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3048.
Nixon used this refrain with media executives. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive
Coma, 90 Calif. L. Rev. 829, 831 n.2 (2002). He also used this refrain with children. See, e.g.,
President Richard Nixon, Telephone Remarks to Students and Educators Attending a Drug
Education Seminar in Monroe,
Louisiana (Oct.
4,
1971),
available
at
http://~.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3179. Further, he used this refrain with
athletes. See, e.g., President Richard Nixon, Remarks to Athletes Attending a White House
Sponsored
Conference
on
Drug
Abuse
(Feb.
3,
1972),
available
at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3674.
President Richard Nixon, Radio Address on Crime and Drug Abuse (Oct. 15, 1972), available at
http://www .presidency. ucsb.edulws/index·. php?pid=3631.
President Richard Nixon, Statement about Drug Abuse Law Enforcen1ent (Sept. 22, 1972),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=3590.
President Richard Nixon, Message to the Congress Transmitting Reorganization Plan 2 of 1973
Establishing the Drug Enforcement Administration (Mar. 28, 1973), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=4159.
•

28.
29.
30.

•

. .
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•

statements. . Under a similar search, Presid~rit Jinm1y Carter never (or at
least rarely) used that tertn. But the rhetoric intensified exponentially under
President Ronald Reagan and went supernova under President George H.W.
32
Bush.
President Reagan's engagement in the War on Drugs focused on
choking off the supply of drugs, from both the street and abroad, under the
logic that if the U.S. stops the illegal supply, then the demand will
automatically vanish. Reagan's direct references to the War on Drugs in
official statements and speeches surpassed President Ford's by a factor of
seven. Although Reagan couched his War in terms of saving American
lives, especially children's lives, his rhetoric nevertheless focused on taking
the war to the suppliers. Reagan's allusions to war tactics were often less
33
than subtle, using terms like "battlefield," "military intelligence," "the
34
36
35
deployment of the armed forces," "battle," and "crusade."
Perhaps
Reagan was no more warrior-like than in his tribute to law enforcement
officers slain during the War on Drugs:
31

•

America's liberty was purchased with the blood of heroes. Our release
from the bondage of illegal drug use is being won at the same dear price.
The battle is ultimately over what America is and what America will be. ·
At our founding, we were promised the pursuit of happiness, not the myth
of en4less ecstasy from a vial of white p~ison. We won our personal
freedom so that we could serve God and Ill:~, so that we could freely
produce and create and build a nation of strong families, rich farms, and
•

•

31.

32.

33.
34.
•

35.
36.

President Gerald Ford, Statement on Drug Abuse (Feb. 23, 1976), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=5609; President Gerald Ford, Special Message
available
at
to
the
Congress
on
Drug
Abuse
(Apr.
27,
1976),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=5875; President Gerald Ford, Remarks at the
Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Miami Beach, Florida
(Sept. 27, 1976), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=6374.
A keyword search of the American Presidency Project for documents of George H. W. Bush
reveals 130 "official" entries using the tenn "war on drugs" and thirty-four using "drug war." See
Am Presidency Project, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index. php.
President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy (Oct. 2, 1982),
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=43085.
President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Drug Abuse (Oct. 6, 1984), available
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?pid=39198. In contrast to military forces
tasked with stopping the supply of drugs, Nancy Reagan was tasked with stopping dentand. Jd.
See also President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the United States Coast Guard Acadenty
Commencement Ceremony in New London, Connecticut (May 18, 1988), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=35847.
President Ronald Reagan: Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug
Abuse (Mar. 7, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=35521.
President Ronald Reagan, Retnarks at a White House Ceremony Honoring Law Enforcement
19, 1988), available at
Officers Slain in the War on Drugs (Apr.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid= 35698.

•

•
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great cities. We. struggled for liberty in order to cherish it and defend it
37
and transmit it undiminished to our children and theirs.
.

Reagan also explicitly framed the War as a struggle .between "us" against
"them," a struggle of national values against some unnamed terror~
· George H.W. Bush .brought with him to the .Presidency the warrior
mindset to which he had devoted himself as Vice President as ~ip of the
spear in the Reagan administration's War on Drugs. With well over one
hundred official references in just a limited search of the American
Presidency Project documents, the War on Drugs brand name and the
phrase "drug wars" were ubiquitous in the Bush lexicon. Shortly after he
was sworn in, President Bush made remarks after the swearing-in ceremony
9
38
of the first "drug czar," William Bennett/ to oversee the new executive
40
Office of National Drug Control Policy. In his statement, Bush joined the
trajectory of increasingly explicit war references to the U.S.'s drug
problem:
.

Bill is the
first Director of
the Nati~nal D~g Council (sic] Policy you,
.
.
soldiers of this crusade. And drug abuse assaults the mind and the spirit
of America, leaving damaged lives and destroyed careers. So, we've got
. to mobilize our moral, spiritual, and economic resources to force a decline
41
in drug trafficking and in drug abuse.

•

.

President Bush was probably at his most martially stirring with the
following:
•

•

Well, the soldiers in the drug battle have been risking their lives. Too
often bureaucratic conflict here in Washington has hobbled our national
effort. So, this has got to end. No war was ever won with two dozen
generals acting independently. And I have chosen Bill Bennett to be the
commanding general in the drug war. . It is his responsibility, working
with the departments and agencies headed by those you see here with me

•

37.
38.

39.
•

40.
41.

/d.

Historically, "czar'' refers to either a Russian emperor or an autocrat. Its contemporruy m~ning
is "one in authority." WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY~ 284 (Houghton Miffiin Co.
1995).
Drug War History and Issues in a Nutshell, DRUG ACTION NETWORK (2002-2003),
http://drugactionnetwork.com: 16080/history/?content=drugwar. Bennett's appointment was more
than a little ironic given his addictions to smoking and gambling as well as his penchant for
drinking. /d.
Id.
President George Bush, Remarks Following the Swearing-in Ceren1ony for William J. Bennett as
Director of National Drug Control Policy (Mar. 13, 1989), available at
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 16769.
•

•

•

•

•
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and oth~rs, to develop a strategy for this war. So, I c~arge him with
putting all the parts of the Federal Government in harness, pulling together
in a life-and-death struggle against a deadly enemy. I will not tolerate,
and the country cannot afford, bureaucratic infighting that forces us to
42
fight this battle with one ann tied behind our back.

Bennett responded in kind:
The President has asked for total effort. He has asked for action on each
and every front. . . . We want to see waiting lines for drug treatment
reduced and prison cells for drug pushers increased.... [T]his
administration wants to work with all the good citizens of America to win
43
the war.

As a consequence, highlights of Bush's War on Drugs included a 50%
increase in military spending to combat drug trafficking and the U.S.
invasion of Panama to arre~t General Manuel Noriega on trafficking,
44
racketeering, and money laundering charges.
President Bill Clinton seemed rarely to make official reference to the
War on Drugs except at press briefings, but his administration was keen to
continue the progress in .reducing the U.S.'s drug problems. Part of
Clinton's. silence resulted from a deliberate policy to tone down the
overheated anti-drug rhetoric and thereby redirect the War's efforts to
45
treatment and prevention.
Unfortunately, he found de-politicizing, or
perhaps de-milita~zing, the War to be difficult, and he was unable to get
. the then-Republican Congress to redirect money from interdiction and law
46
enforcement. Additionally ~nfortunate were the political attacks during
his 1996 re-election campaign that his "liberal, drug policies were not
working. As a consequence, Clinton increased his anti-drug rhetoric to out47
shout his opponent, Bob Dole. Indeed~ the Clinton presidency is notable
for its significant up-tick in military and law-enforcement operations,
including the arrests of leaders of the Colombian Cali cartel and of Mexican
48
bankers for money-laundering (Operation Casablanca). And in harmony
with the adage that "no politician has ever seen his approval ratings decline

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.
48.

•

/d.
/d.
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 136.
Michael Kramer, The Political Interest: The Phony Drug War, TIME, Sept. 2, 1996,
http://www. time.com/timelmagazine/article/0,9171 ,985050,00.html.
GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 136-37.
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.

•
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49

by · being tough on · drugs, " the Clinton ·administration expanded federal
50
law enforcement dramatically with "hard-line penal policies."
That hard-line approach did not change during the presidency of
George W. Bush. But during his two-term presidency, Bush was less of a
cheerleader in the War on Drugs and more of an enabler. A mere handful
of mon~s into his first . tenn, Bush had a War on Terror to fight .s o he
handed off the important combat operations of the War on Drugs to
appointees. Employing the services of the Depal'bnent of Justice, Attorney .
51
General John D. Ashcroft early on vowed to oppose teen drug use, but his
rhetoric was· nevertheless war-like: "Well, I want to escalate the war on
52
drugs. I want to renew it. I want to refresh it, relaunch it if you will."
Bush's first appointee to head the DEA, Asa Hutchinson, viewed the War
on Drugs. as a crusade, having spent a significant amount of time as a
Congressman on drug war issues while favoring an escalation of the. War in
Colombia and refusing to retreat from draconian sentencing for drug
53
users. Likewise, Bush's Drug Czar, John Walters, brought a background
that relied extensively on the "Andean Strategy," a decade-long plan
costing billions of dollars and escalating the War's mili~ary operations in
54
Latin Amenca.
·
Unfortunately, the War on Terror intensified the fervor for the War on
Drugs. Not to be outdone by the attention paid to the War on Terror, the .
.drug warriors had to up the ante. Less than a month after th~ September 11
attacks, a State Department director testified to links between the Taliban
55
and financing terrorist activities through drug trade. At a criminal justice

49.
50.
51.
52.

Kramer, supra note 46.
Marie Gottschalk, Dismantling the Carcera/ State: The Future ofPenal Policy Refonn, 84 TEX. L.
REV. 1693, 1740 (2006).
David A. Vise & Dan Eggen, U.S.: Violence, Teen Drug Use Are Ashcroft Priorities, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 2001, http://www.mapinc.org/drugnews/v01/n228/a04.html?l267.
President Bush Appoints Drog Warriors to High Administration Positions, COMMON SENSE FOR
DRUG POL'Y, available at www.csdp.org/news/news/warcabinet.htm; GoTISCHALK, supra note
50, at 1740.
COMMON SENSE, supra note 52.
•

53.
54.
55.

/d.
RAPHAEL F. PERL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21041, TALIBAN AND THE DRUG TRADE 4

(2001),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf; William Bach, Director, Office
of Asia, Africa, Europe, NIS Programs, Testimony Before the Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources (Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/septll/testimony_OOl.asp; see
also Doug Stokes, "Iron Fists in Iron Gloves": The Political Economy of U.S. Terrorocracy
Promotion in Colombia, 8 BRITISH J. POL. & INT'L STUD. 368 (2006) (positing that U.S. longtetm interests in financing counter;.insurgency efforts in Colombia conveniently shifted from an
anti-communism rationale to anti-drug and anti-terrorism).
•

•
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conference in London during Summer 2002, Asa Hutchinson likened the
War on Drugs to the combating of terrorism:
I am here to speak about another war today the war on drugs. · It is
perhaps not as intriguing as the war on terrorism ···-but as we know drug
trafficking and terrorism are two _ evils that exist in the same
jungle. ~ .. The nations represented in this room understand the human
suffering that comes with war. We know that war should be avoided, but
not at the sacrifice of freedom. We know wars are fought to sustain
democracy, but they are not without costs. We know that the-costs of war
mu.st be weighed against what is lost when evil triumphs.
These realities of war are common in democratic societies. We know they
are also true when it comes to our shared struggle against illegal drugs. If
we avoid war, then democracy will suffer; if we flinch at the costs, then a
greater price will be paid 'by families, by communities, and by our
6
nations. 5

•

Not to be outd~ne, Attorney General Ashcroft went on an extended crusade
57
58
against cbug paraphemalia and medical marijuana, taking the War to
59
By 2005, federal and state
new heights of law enforcement power.
governments were spending nearly sixty times more on cleaning_up after
60
substance abuse problems than on prevention.
·
Nearly forty years into the War on Drugs, its victories are Pyrrhic at
61
62
best. Experts criticized its misdirection early and continually. Aside
from the geopolitical disaster it caused, the War's effect on the U.S. itself
•

•

56.
57.
58.
59.

60.
6L
62.

Asa Hutchinson, Director, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Speech at Modernizing Criminal Justice
Conference (June 1_8, 2002}, available at www.justice.gov/ dea/speechesls061802p.html.
Jesse Katz, White House Tries to Ban the Bong, ROLLING STONE, 54 (July 24, 2003).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
In his crusading zeal, Ashcroft even used the full weight of the Justice Department to convey his
displeasure against any federal judges perceived as not committed enough to the War:
In 2004,- Republicans on the ·House Judiciary Committee led a successful effort to
force the_United States Sentencing Commission to provide Congress with the names of
federal judges who departed from [drug] sentencing guidelines. In August 2003, the
Justice Department announced it would begin compiling data on judges who mete out
lighter sentences than the federal guidelines prescribe, a move some critics likened to
the creation of a "blacklist,, ofjudges.
Gottschalk, supra note. 50, at 1740.
Nat'l Ctr. on Addiction & Substance Abuse at Columbia U., Shoveling Up II: The Impact of
Substance Abuse on Federal, State and Local Budgets, ii (May 2009).
See generally Merrill A. Smith, 11le Drog Problem-Is There an Answer?, 52 FEo. PROBATION 3
(1988).
Ben Wallace-Wells & Eric Magnuson, How-America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING STONE, 90
(Dec. 13~ 2Q07).

•
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has been enonnous~ .· The criticisms ·range _from the economic

63

to the
cynical, including the view that the War is merely a political game to
64
position politicians for re-election. Others criticized its emphasis on law
65
enforcement rather than on public health.
One typically astringent
observation is that the War was waged without e?C-amining the effectiveness
66
of the weapons while another is that the U.S. now has an unthinkably
huge prison population, bloated by the increasingly harsh and indefensible
68
67
critninal penalties for drug offenses that are racist. As all these critics
69
and critiques agree, "Drug abuse is bad, but the drug war is worse."
Perhaps worst of all is that the pride of the U.S. govetnment, its rule of law,
70
went missing in action.

•
•

•

•

•

.

63.

64.

65.

66.
67.

.

See, e.g.; Matthew A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Nonns and Marijuana Prohibition, 4
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 229 (2010); Cynthia S. Duncan, Note, The Need for Change: An
Economic Analysis of Marijuana Policy, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1701 (2009); Mary Carmichael, The
Case for Treating Drug Addicts · in Prison, NEWSWEEK (June 29, 2010),
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/06/29/the-case-for-treating-drug-addicts-in-prison.html.
Ross C. "Rocky" Anderson, We Are All Casualties of Friendly Fire in the· War on Drogs, 13
UTAH B. J. 10, 10 (Nov. 2000).
.
See, e.g., NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DRUG
POL~Y TASK FORCE: lll. PuB. HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF CURRENT DRUG POL,Y (Oct. 1996),
available at http://www.drugtext.org/New-York-County-Lawyers· Association/iii -public-healthconsequences-of-current-drug-policy.html.
Anderson, supra note 64, at 12.
See, e.g., Eric Schlosser, More Reefer Madness, THE ATL. MONTHLY, (April1997), available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97apr/reef.htm. "The war on drugs has helped tum
the United States into the country with the world's largest prison population.... The U.S. has 5%
of the world's population and around 25% of the world's prisoners." Bernd Debusmann,
Einstein, Insanity and the War on Drugs, THE GREAT DEBATE (Dec. 3, 2008, 10:02 PM),
•

68.
•

69.

70.

blogs.reuters/great-debate/2008/12/03/Einstein-insanity-and-the·war-on-dnlgs/.
See, e.g., Andrew D. Black, Note, "The War on People:" Reframing "The War on Drugs" by

Addressing Racism within American Drug Policy Through Restorative Justice and Community
Collaboration, 46 U. LoUISVILLE L. REv. 177 (2007-2008); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws:
The New Jim Crow, 63 ALA. L. REv. 703 (2000).
Drug Abuse is Bad, But the Drug War Is Worse, CHRISTIANSAGAINSTPROHIBITION.ORG (Aug. 8,
2010), http://christiansagainstprohibition.org/LEAP_Drug_War_Worse_Handout.
See, e~g., Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66
S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1992-1993); Roger Pilon, Tenants, Students. and Drugs: A Comment on
the War on the Rule ofLaw, 2002 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227,227 (2002).

•

•

2011]

•

,.

War as Metaphor
•

III. GO ASK ALICE

•

71

•

The War-on-Drugs trope in schools did not focus on militarized
language at the outset because one of the underlying themes of the War was
to protect children's health and safety by keeping them away from drugs
drug
abuse
and·
and by reducing the violence th~t allegedly accompanies
.
dealing in the schools. These good intentions did not have any real focus
until it became the First Lady's project under Nancy Reagan in the midl980s. Simultaneously, her husband began to frame the War in schools as
· just one part of the overall battle plan. That framing escalated into mission
creep until, today, school officials often view themselves as warriors ·with
individual military tasks and view students as the military obJectives. The
fault lies with all three branches of the federal govermnent and their
individual responses to the militarized metaphor, crossing the line from
·
metaphorical marketing to literal application.
A. The Executive: "Uncle Sam Wants You"

72

From the beginning, the U.S's pursuit of the enemy in the War on

Drugs has targeted those engaged in drug trafficking, with legislation and
goverrunent agencies designed for interdiction through law enforcement
73
and military engagement. Although Nixon's vision was to include drug
treatment as a War strategy, the U.S. government did not prioritize
prevention as a strategy, instead focusing on supply rather than demand. In
the mid-1970s, a parental movement against teen drug abuse had loosely
coalesced, and the National Institute- of Drug Abuse joined the parents'

•

•

71.

ANONYMOUS, Go ASK ALICE (1971 ); see also JEFFERSON AIRPLANE, White Rabbit, on
SURREALISTIC PILLOWt (RCA Victor 1967). Go Ask Alice is a young adult book about the perils

of drug addiction, published just as the War on Drugs was beginning its windup. It "was
published in 1971 as a 'real diary' about a good girl who is turned on to drugs by friends, runs
away, trades sex for fixes and dies." Mark Oppenheimer, Just Say ·Uh-Oh; 'N.Y. TIMES, 1 (Nov.
15, 1998), available at http://www.nytimes.com/booksl 98/1111 S/reviews/9811 S.lSoppenht.html.
Originally touted as the actual diary of a teenage girl, the book is now listed by the publisher as ·
·fiction after its "editort Beatrice Sparks, conceded that the book is not entirely true. Further
inquiry suggests that none of it is true. Lina Goldberg, ,.Curiouser and Curiouser ": Fact,
Fiction, and th.e Anonymous Author of Go Ask Alice, 2 (Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.linagoldberg.com/goaskalicel html. The book became and remains; to a certain
extent, a popular teen book. ld~ at 5. Unfortunately, the book reflects the overly simplistic
framing of the_teen drug problem adopted during the War: "Fall in with the wrong crowd and you
will do drugs, turn against America and dishonor your parents." Oppenheimer, supra, at 2.
James Montgomery Flagg, I Want You/or the U.S. Anny, LESLIE,S WEEKLY cover (July 6, 1916),
available at http://wwwJoc.gov/exhibits/treasures/tl'mOlS. html.
See generally Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
•

72.

73.
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effort.
But their ·strategy did not really ·focus on r~ducing. demand,
especially not on the source· of risky and addictive behavior in adolescence..
Instead, these national efforts targeted Hollywood and the media as the
enemies and took them to task for glamorizing drugs as the cause for teen
75
drug use. Eventually, attacking these hard targets was not enough because
its focus was wrong-headed and did not directly engage the real enemy.
President Reagan made no secret of the fact that schools themselves
76
were battlefields in· the War on Drugs.
However,
it
was
not
until
1984
.
that the women's auxiliary undertook its wartime task when Nancy Reagan
adopted her campaign against student drug use, following an appearance at
77
an Oakland, California school. In the oft-repeated story, a ten-year-old
student asked Mrs. Reagan what she should do if someone were to offer her
78
drugs. Mrs. Reagan resp.onded, ·''Just say no.'' From that incident, "Just
Say No" clubs sprang up all over the country, backed by the govermnent
79
but funded by private and corporate donors. Thereafter, President Reagan
repeatedly referenced Mrs . Reagan's war efforts whenever he spoke about
80
the War on Drugs. The "Just Say No" campaign was an essential
part
of
.
74

.

.

74.

.

/d. If the War on Drugs could be said to have any war profiteers, Dr. Robert DuPont, bead of the
Nat'l Iilst. ofDrug Abuse from 1973 to 1978, would be one of them.. Since leaving government,
DuPont has reap~ significant commercial benefit as. a leading proponent of urinalysis testing.·
DuPont's company Bensinger, DuPont Associates-manages alcohol and drug testing in the
workplace. See http://www.bensingerdupont.com/; Ryan Grim, Blowing Smoke.: Why random
drug testing doem't reduce student drug use, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2006, 1:13 PM),
www.slate.comltoolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2138399.
See, e.g., Frontline· Chronology, supra note 18; see also H. Republican Pol'y Comm., Clinton
Raises White Flag: Policy Statement on How to Win the War on Dru_gs,
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1996/lupc_drugs.htm (last updated October 1, 2006).
Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug Abuse, supra note35.
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18; Claire Suddath, The War on Drogs, TIME, Mar. 25, 2009,
available at www~time.com/time/printout/0,8816, 1887488,00.html.
Suddath, supra note 77; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Campaign Rally for Senator
James T. Broyhill in Raleigh, North Carolina (Oct 8; 1986), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/ index.php?p.id=36567; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at
a White House Briefing for Senior Staff on the Congressional and.Gubernatorial Election Results.
(Nov~ 6, 1986), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ ws/index.php?pid=36695; President
Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the National Conference on Corporate Initiatives for ·a Drug Free
Workplace (June 9, 19,88), ·available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=
35950.
Frontline Chronology, supra note 18;. Suddath, supra note 77; President Ronald Reagan, Remarks
on Signing the Just Say No to Drugs Week Proclamation (May 20, 1986), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb. edulwslindex.php?pid=37306.
Remarks on Signing th~ Just Say No to Drugs. Week Proclamation, supra note 79. Reagan's
remarks about his wife's involvement in the War on Drugs was not unlike·the publicity of Eleanor
Roosevelt's panicipation in the "Knitting for Victory'' campaign during World War II. Paula
Becker, Knitting for Victory-World War II, HISTORYLINK.ORG (Aug. 19, 2004),
http://www.historylink.orglindex.cfm?DisplayPage=output cfm&File_Id==5722; Knitting During
.

75.

76.
77.
78.

79.

80.
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-. Reagan's War, but n~· cotmnitment existed to coordin~te what was
essentially a volunteer anny to any specific govermnent effort to prevent
drug abuse in schools. His successor would. become the chief recruiter of
drug warriors in schools.
From the beginning of his term, President George H. W. Bush
specifically incorporated schools into his drug-war rhetoric and battle plans. .
He started out moderately: "To spread the word and thus stem demand,
we're going to need more money for education and prevention.... And. we
81
need to educate, involve parents, teachers, and cotmnunities. '' · Barely a
we;ek later,. Bush explicitly recruited students in the War: "You have
partners in your cotnmunity and in others across the United States, and you
have partners in the war on drugs in Washington, right there on
82
Pennsylvania Avenue.... I need, your help.'" One of those partners would
be law enforcement in the schools:
'

'

I mentioned that I'm going to talk about enforcement later on today,_but I
don't want to leave here without saying to you the enforcement side of
this equation· is absolutely essential, whether it's in the corridors of this
outstanding high achievement school or whether it's downtown Lancaster
or wherever it is. The authorities must enforce the law, and we must make
an example of those who are pushing drugs onto the lives of the oth~rs
around here..... The war on drugs will ultimately be won one day, one
battle at a time the battles each and every one of us wage to keep our
families and commu.tiities free from drug abuse.... And so, let these
banners be a battle cry ... we will join together, turn the tide, and bring
83
the epidemic to an end with finality over history.

Not only were students rec~ited as co-combatants,_ but school
employees were the warrior-leaders: ''As I look around here today, I see
some of the top commandos in the war on drugs: our teachers, principals,
84
community leaders, parents, and students." The cause had been joined.

•

81.
82.
83.
84,

World War II, NAT'L WWII MUSEUM, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/calendarlknit-yourbit.htrill#Knitting_ during_World_War_ll.
.
Remarks Following the Swearing-In Ceremony for William J. Bennett as Director ofNat'l Drug
Control Pol,y, supra note 41.
President George Bush, Remarks to Students at Conestoga Valley High School in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania (Mar. 22, l989)~ available at www.presidency.ucsb..edu/ws/index.php?pid=l6823.
ld.
President George Bush, Re~narks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Drug-Free Schools Awards
(June 19, 1989), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/wslindex.php?pid=l7168.

•

•
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An army, however, needs artillery and munitions, so Congress
complied by enacting mandates to help schools prevent drug abuse, usually
obliquely and nominally, but mainly to force them _to become drug-free.
Al~ough Congress passed numerous statutes designed to curb youth drug
86
abuse, the primary legislation ~o focus . on schools derived from the
Reagan-era Drug-Free Schools and Connnunities Act of 1986, a component
87
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. The latter Act was but one of
88
several in the Drug-Free America Act of 1986, touted by President
Reagan as essential to "this national crusade, [in which] each of us is a
89
critical soldier.'' That version of the Drug-Free Schools Act focused on
90
"enforcement, prevention, and intervention to reduce illegal drug use" and
91
State and
provided funding for schools to reduce student drug abuse.
local grants were funded and· awarded to "encourage and support broadbased cooperation among schools, connnunities, parents, and governmental
92
Unfortunately,
the
Orug-Free
Schools
Act
is
now·
agencies."
.
char~cterized as one ()f the strategies for "fuel[ing] the war on drugs and
.
.

•

•

.

85.

Libr.
of
Cong.,
General
Cable
Corp.. poster · (1942),
http://www.loc.gov/teacherslclassroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/
presentationslhomefront/gallery.html.

86.

See U.S. GoV'T. ACCOUNfABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-3, SAFE AND DRUG·FREE SCHOOLS:

available

at

BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY WITH STATE AND LocAL FLEXIBll..ITY 7-9 (1997) [hereinafter
1997 GAO ACCOUNrABILITY REP.]; see also U.S. GoV'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAOffHEHS-97-166, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND VIOLENCE PREVENTION: MULTIPLE YOUTH PROGRAMS .
RAISE QUESTIONS OF EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 1-2 (1997); see generally EDITH
FAIRMAN COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 20532, 1HE SAFE AND DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS
AND COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 2 (2002).

87.
88.

Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat 3207 (1986); COOPER, supra note 86,
at I n.4.
President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress Transmitting Proposed Legislation to Combat
Drug
Abuse
and
Trafficking
(Sept.
15,
1986),
available
at
www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1986/091586b.htm.
,

89. /d.
90. · Melody Lark, The Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1986: Policy. Fonnation,
Causation, and Program Implementation, I (1995) (paper presented at Annual Meeting of Am.
Educ. Res. Ass'n), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ PDFSIED389994.pdf.
91. Peter Reuter & P. Michael Timpane, Options for Restructuring the Safe and Drug-Free Schools
and Communities Act in PETER REUTER ET AL., OPTIONS FOR RESTRUCTURING THE SAFE AND
DRUG-fREE SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: REPORT WITH BACKGROUND PAPERS AND FOCUS
GROUP
SUMMARY
4
(RAND
Monograph
Rep.
2001),
available
at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MRI328.1/MR1328.1.options.pdf
[hereinafter
REUTER RAND MONOGRAPH].

92.

SARAH M. BENNETT-HARPER, ET AL., CHARACTERISTICS OF SDFSCA SEA. AND GoVERNORS'
PROGRAMS: VOL. I, SUMM. OF THE 1999-2000 DATA COLLECTION 1-1 (U.S. Dep't. of Educ.
2002), available at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/ safety/9900statereport/report.pdf.
•
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93

perpetuat[ing] it in schools throughout the riation." It and related state
policies are criticized for being "[in]compatible with the perspectives of the
education administrators or the experiences of the target group~
students,"94 particularly because the federal funding was intended to finance
95
law enforcement in the schools instead of prevention programs.
In 1988, Congress did try to focus more on drug use prevention and
education when it moved the Drug-Free Schools Act to the Elementary and
96
Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA), and amended it with the Anti97
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and later with the Drug-Free Schools and
98
· Cotmt1unities Act of 1989.
The 1988 amendments were to furnish
additional resources for states and local agencies to use for "drug abuse
prevention, early intervention, rehabilitation referral, and education in
99
elementary and secondary schools."
However, Congress's attention
ineluctably moved back to militarization of the War on Drugs, even in
schools. In 1990, President Bush and the governors adopted six millennial
100
goals f~r the nation's schools to achieve.
Goal .number six asserted that,
by 2000, "every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and
101
will offer a disciplined environment conducive to leaming."
The group
promoted education and community involvement as two resources to
102
achi~ve this goal, but · the most prominent resource was discipline.
103
Perhaps. this route was adopted because of public testimony in its favor:
the "written testimony [for goal six] focused .disproportionately on
104
discipline," and the teachers' unions linked school discipline with ·s tudent

•

•

•

Lark, supra note 90, at 1.
/d. at 16.
ld.
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat 27 (1965); COOPER, supra
note 86, at I. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was originally enacted in
1965, as part and parcel of the War on Poverty. As a spending act, ESEA requires reauthorization
every six years. Its current iteration includes the No Child Left Behind Act. A Glossary ofSchool
· Finance Terms, EDSOURCE 5 (Aug. 2004), http://www.llesd.k12.ca.us!EEE_FinanceTetnls.pdf.
97. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat 4181 (1988); HAw. ST. DEP'T. OF
EDUC., OFFICE OF INSTRUCTIONAL SERV., DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT OF
1986, PART 2, HANDBOOK 1 (1989).
98. Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-226, 103 Stat.
1934 (1989).
99. HAW. ST. DEP'T OF Epuc., supra note 97, at 1.
100. JAMES B. STEDMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ED 359634, NATIONAL EDUCATION GoALS:
WHERE ARE WE Now? 6 (1990), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ PDFSIED359634.pdf.
101. /d. at 21.
102. Id. at 23.
103. NAT'L EDUC. GoALS PANEL, MEASURING PROGRESS TOWARD THE NATIONAL EDUCATION
GoALS: PUBLIC TESTIMONY, VOL. 2: SUMM. OF TESTIMONY ON MEASURES FOR 1991 PROGRESS
REP. 23 (1991), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED334275.pdf.
104. Id.

93.
94.
95.
96.

•

•
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drug problems. ~ In so doing, student drug use became inextricably and
incorrectly linked to school safety rather than standing as a singular
problem with its own unique solutions.
.
When Congress reauthorized the ESEA in 1994, as the Improving .
106
America's Schools Act,
it re-branded the Drug-Free Schools and
Conununities portion of the ESEA by incorporating it with the Safe Schools·
Act to become, together, the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
107
Act of 1994 (SDFSC). · The purpose of this marriage of acts was to "help
the nation's schools provide a disciplined environment conducive to
learning by eliminating violence in and around schools and preventing
108
illegal drug use."
Congress thereby expressly linked
.
state
and
local
.
grants for student drug problems with violence reduction and school
109
safety.
SDFSC also incorporated accountability standards to review the
110
use of those funds.
By making that link, Congress hoped to achieve
schools entirely -free of violence, drugs, alcohol, and guns by the year 2000.·
111
Unfortunately, accountability proved ephemeral.
A Congressional
Research Service report noted the following:

•

.

In 2000, a national evaluation of the SDFSC program by [the Department
of Education] was released. Surveyors found that the efforts of several
[local. educational agencies] to reduce school violence
and
drug
use
.
through the program were haphazard, and federal funds might be spread
too thin. Also, it was· found that only 50% of the 600 [local educational
agencies] canvassed have a definitive goal in place for prevention efforts,
such as changing
student
behaviors
or
attitudes
toward
violence
and
drug
.
use; [local educational agencies] with a goal lacked quality data to assess
•

•

105. !d. at 25.
•

106. Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, 108 Stat. 4029 (1994); 1997
GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 5.
107. Goals 2000: Educate America Act, Pub. L. No. 103-227, 108 Stat. 125 (1994); COOPER, supra
note 86, at 1; 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 1.
108. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY
REP., supra note 86, at l.
.
109. The states' allotments were divided into 20% for governors' grants and 80% for local schools.
Lawrence W. Shennan, The Safe and Drog-Free Schools Program, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
Eouc.
POL'Y:
2000
125,
142
(2000),
available
at
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumalslbrookings_papers_on_education_ policy/v2000/2000.1 sherman.pdf.
Lawrence Shennan suggests that this discretionary funding was ''wasted on perfonning
magicians, fishing trips, and school concerts and on methods (such as counseling) that research
shows to be inefrective." /d. at 126. Whether or not Shennan's comments are hyperbole, it is true
that three years after the 1994 enactment of SDFSC, DOE had completed no overall evaluation of
the grants program. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 4.
110. 1997 GAO ACCOUNTABILITY REP., supra note 86, at 3, 9.
111. See id. at 5; Robert B. Charles, Back to the Future: The Collapse ofNational Drog Control Policy
and a Blueprint for Revitalizing the Nation's Counternarcotics Effort, 33 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 339,
403 (1996).
•

.

•
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progress; and only 9% had implemented prevention programs based on
research. Others used programs like D.A.R.E., which has been found by
some analysts to be ineffective. The [Department of Education]
concluded that it was questionable to what extent [local educational
agencies] were complying with the Principles of Effectiveness that require
gran~ees to use program funds to support research-based drug and violence
112
prevention programs for youth.

Nevertheless, Congress persisted in repeating the same· mistakes in the War
in schools.
The 2002 ESEA reauthorization the No Child Left Behind Act
113
(NCLB)
once again incorporated the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and
Communities Act; this time as an integral part of ESEA's Title IV- 21st
114
Century Schools. This iteration of the drug-free schools effort focuses on
115
both state and federal grants to "prevent the illegal use. of alcohol,
tobacco, and drugs ... [and] to foster a safe and drug-free learning
116
environment that supports student academic achievement." Local school
districts can apply for funds to finance discipline, law enforcement, and
· prevention, including "security activities"; "student testing and data
reporting''; "education activities"; "counseling, mentoring and other student
support activities"; "training and monitoring of school personnel"'; and
117
ufamily, c_ommunity, and emergency activities." The receipt of funds is
conditioned on the local sc~ool district's providing a plan for keeping its
schools drug- and violence-free, and this plan should include school
discipline policies that prohibit disorderly conduct and illegal possession of
drugs and weapons;· security procedures; prevention activities for a safe
environment; a crisis management plan; and a code of conduct. us Thus; in
order to get funds, schools must conflate violence with student drug use:
"[T]he program . ·.. embodies confusion of purposes among drug
119
prevention, violence prevention, and school safety," As a result, schools
.

.

112. COOPER, supra note 86, at 27-28.
·
113. No Child Left Behind Act of200l, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
114. COOPER, supra note 86, at 2; GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 34496, SAFE AND
DRUG-fREE
SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES ACT: PROGRAM OVERVIEW AND REAUTHORIZATION
•

115.
116.
117.
11s.
119.

ISSUES 1 (2008).
MCCALLION, supra note 114, at

•

1.

20 u.s.c. § 7102 (2006).
•
McCALLION, supra note 114, at 3-4; 20 U.S.C. § 7115(b)(2) (2006).
20 u.s.c~ § 7Il4(d)(7) (2006).
REUTER & TIMPANE, supra note 91, at 5; 20 U.S.C. §7115(b)(2)(E) (Supp. 2.011) ("drug and
violence prevention activities that may include the following ....''). Similarly suspect are efforts
to couple student drug use with academic failure under No Child Left Behind and to thereby
advocate adding to the Act a new and selective assessment for an additional SQb-population of
students. See Judy Kreamer et al., The Overlooked Cause of Children Being Left Behind: Drug
Use Compromising Academic Success, EDUCATING VOICES, INC. (Feb. 2008),
•

.

.

•
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.:·are incorrectly encouraged to merge law enforcement with educational
prevention strategies to address their student drug problems.
This conflation of violence and drug use did little more than·
increasingly militarize the efforts to contain student drug problems.
Although student drug abuse is likely systemic, violence is not. Schools are
much safer than political forces.make them out to be: "Any school violence
is too much, but it is disastrous to make policy on misinterpretation of data .
Comparisons of violence iri various settings indicate that schools ~e one of
12
the safest institutions for children . " ° Furthermore, the research-based
evidence does not conclusively link drug ·use to school violence or, at the
121
very least, cannot conclusively establish causation .
The crucial
connection is that a violent student is more likely to use drugs; a student's
122
predisposition to violence may also predispose him to drug use.
However, solving one problem does not necessarily solve the other. So
when the govermnent is willing to fund drug testing and locker searches in
123
the War on Drugs, the government is erroneously suggesting to school
. officials that punitive law enforcement strategies designed to curb violence

120.
121.

122.

123.

•

http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/EVJO/o20education
%20and%20drug0/o20use%20white%20paper0/b20jul08.pdf. .There .is no dispute that drugs may
have serious physiologi~al and psychological effects on the user although those effects will vary
to urge that drug use is the sole cause of or even any cause of
depending upon the drug.
.
.However,
.
academic failure is an overly simplistic conclusion to a problem that has so many more variables.
See id. at 7-11. The authors' own professional experiences should have suggested a more
nuanced-and more comprehensive policy prescription than to increase schools'. already
See id. at 16. Besides, at least one empirical
onerous assessment responsibilities under NCLB.
.
study indicates that student drug use, by itself, adversely affects neither behavior nor academic
perfonnance. Thomas J. McMahon & Sunya ~. Luthar, Patterns and Correlates ofSubstance Use
Among Affluent, Suburban High School Students, 35 J. CLINICAL CHILD & ADOLESCENT
PSYCHOL. 72, 85-86 (2006).
Irwin A. Hyman et al., Policy and Practice in School Discipline: Past, Present and Future, 4
(1994), http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED383960.pdf.
See, e.g., Sharon M. Boles & Karen Miotto, Substance Abuse and Violence: A Review of the
Literature, 8 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 155, 165 (2003); Robert Nash Parker & Kathleen
Auerhahn, Alcohol, Drugs, and Violence, 24 ANN. REv. Soc. 291, 306-307 (19~8); see also
Michele Cooley-Strickland et al., Community Violence and Youth: Affoct, Behavior, Substance
Use, and Academics, 12 CLINIC-t\L CHILD FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 127 (2009); but see Kristin D.
Eisenbraun, Violence in Schools: Prevalence, Prediction, and Prevention, 12 AGGRESSION &
VIOLENT BEHAV. 459, 462 (2007); Richard Lowry et al., School Violence, Substance Use, and
Availability of Illegal Drugs on School Property among US High School Students, 69 J. SCH.
HEALTH 347 (2009). Alcohol is the more likely culprit in causing violent behavior in general
while drug dealing is the more likely culprit in violent behavior associated w~th drugs. Boles &
Miotto, supra, at 161 , 165.
Peter Venturelli, Drugs in Schools: Myths and Realities, 561 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci.
72, 77 (Jan. 2000). Adolescent violence is linked to other impulsive
and
risk-taking
behaviors
.
.
Boles & Miotto, supra note 121, at 157.
MCCALLION, supra note 114, at 3. As part of their drug prevention strategies, school districts can
get funding for drug testing and locker searches. 20 U.S.C. § 4115(b)(2)(E)(xiv) (2006).
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will be just as successful at solving their student drug problems. That
fallacious linkage is specifically contrary to the traditional educational
philosophy that prevention strategies in student violence are more
124
successful than punitive strategies.
"These debates reveal the extent to
which we ignore and/or distort social science data and support punitive
practices such as corporal punishment, school suspensions and expulsions,
and questionable measures such as metal detectors, strip searches, and
125
draconian sentencing for minors."
And that fallacious linkage is clearly
contrary to the empirical evidence that Congress's war-time efforts are an
abysmal failure; by 2006, .the Office of Management and Budget rated the
state grants prograrn for Safe and Drug-Free Schools as "not perfortning:
126
results not demonstrated."
C. The Judiciary: "Do Your Bit for Arnerica"

127
•

The Executive branch specially enlisted lawyers as warriors in the
128
War on Drugs.
As a consequence, courts were already prepared to
engage the enemy. The Supreme Court, in particular, has enthusiastically
· embraced the opportunity to do its bit in the War on Drugs, especially given
the Court's limited capacity for direct combat operations. At the very least,
the Court has acted as the enabler for the school drug-warriors in a series of
cases that have suspended the civil liberties of students in favor · of
129
advancing the War, not unlike Lincoln's war-time suspension of habeas
•

•

124. Hyman et al., supra note 120, at 1. NCLB has taken its own share of the blame for·exacerbating
school violence problems because of its "overly intense spotlight on academic progress to the
detriment of attention to social development of young people, which arguably leads to student
alienation, violence, and tragedy.... Indeed, the testing-focused culture ofNCLB. is indicted for
creating the elements of fear and powerlessness that generate resistance and violence." Jane Clark
Lindle, School Safety: Real or Imagined Fear?, 22 Eouc. POL'Y 28,37 (2008).
125. /d.
126. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROGRAM ASSESSMENT: SAFE AND DRUG fREE SCHOOLS
STATE
GRANTS
(2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.
gov/omb/expectmore/detail/1 0000200.2006.html; see also MCCALLION, supra note 114, at 5 n.l 0 .
OMB similarly found the SDFSCA state grant programs to be "ineffective" in 2002. /d.
127. President Woodrow Wilson, Proclamation to the American People (Apr. 16, 1917) (following the
U.S.'s declaration of war), available at http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/doyourbit.htm;
President Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Nation (Apr. 16, 1917), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 65399.
128. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies
(Sept. 9, 1988), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 36352.
129. Not all courts were so sanguine about the necessity of suspending constitutional rights for the War
on Drugs. One court likened warrantless police searches etnployed in the War as rentiniscent of
Hitler's Berlin, Stalin's Moscow, and apartheid's South Africa. Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153,
1158 (Fla. 1989), rev 'd 501 U.S. 429 (1991). "Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a 'war on
drugs.' No one disputes that it is the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons
for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcentent technique is not proof of its
constitutionality., /d. at 440 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
•
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corpus. Seduced by the militaristic rhetoric, the Court's words and deeds
reveal a certain relish in imposing discipline on children who appeal to
them for protection under the law.
The irony is that, in the judicial process, the enemy necessarily
becomes specific and identifiable. No longer is the enemy an elusive drug
trafficker or some unidentifiable "them," but instead a particular juvenile .
antagonist against the weight of the governmental entity waging the War.
Thus, the Supreme Court's arc of suspending the rule of law under ·the
exigencies of this War first engaged a fourteen-year-old girl in New Jersey
130
·v. T.L. 0. until that arc reached its inevitable nadir with the strip-search of
31
a thirteen-year-old girl in Safford Unified School District v. Redding}
Worse yet, the Court's skirmishes against the enemy started in 1985, before
the Executive and the Legislature were fully engaged in making schools
into battlegrounds. But for the Court's willingness to suspend the rule of
law so early in the War, school officials may not have felt so emboldened to
voluntaJily enlist.
It all started with a search-and-seizure case involving a violation of
school rules. In 1980, a high school teacher in Piscataway, New Jersey,
132
discovered two freshman girls smoking in the restroom.
When
133
confronted
by a school administrator, one girl confessed; T.L.O. did not.
.
.
Upon he~ denial that she had violated the school rule, the administrator took
T.L.O. into his office and requested that she open her.purse, whereupon the
administrator found cigarettes as well as marijuana and paraphernalia
rela~ed to both using and dealing rolling papers, a pipe, plastic bags, and a
134
list of students who owed money.
The administrator turned T.L.O. over
135
to the ·police, and the State .brought juvenile charges against her.
The
case pivoted on the legality of the warrantless search of T.L.O.'s purse
insofar as its contents served as the underlying evidence of delinquency.
The Court's decision emphatically imposed the restrictions of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments on school districts for student searches: "In
carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such
poli~ies, school officials act as representatives of the State, and not merely
•

130. N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
131. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009). In Safford, a school
administrator authorized the warrantless strip search of a thirteen-year-old female student to
search for prescription-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, both banned from
school grounds by school board policy unless the student had pet mission. !d. at 2638.
132. T.L. 0., 469 U.S. at 328.
133 !d.
134. !d.
135. Id. at 328-29.
•

•
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~ ·s urrogates for the parents."

136

Hqwever, the flexibility of a school's
relationship with its students and the swiftness of the need to act in
disciplinary circumstances allowed for warrantless · searches of students
137
under certain circumstances.
The Court framed a school official's prerogative to search as an
138
"effective method[] to deal with breaches of public order."
Howev~r, the
Court also framed the school official's prerogative as being part and parcel
of school discipline, that the prerogative relates to the "close supervision of
139
schoolchildren."
In so framing that prerogative, the Court made clear
that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
meant respecting the privacy interests ·of students, or their legitimate
40
expectations of privacy,I so the Court fotntulated a test for allowing a
student's warrantless search depending upon the circumstances surrounding
141
That test entails a two-step analysis of reasonability: First,
the search.
the search has to be justified at its inception and depends upon whether the
school official had "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will
turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law
142
or the rules
of
the
school."
Second,
the
scope
~f
the
search
is
.
constitutionally acceptable "when the measures adopted [were] reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light
143
of the age and.sex of the student and the nature of the infraction."
The T.L.O. case was triggered by the school administrator's suspicion
that the girl had broken a school rule and then evolved into a controlled
substance issue for a juvenile delinquency proceeding when the police were
called. Thus, the Court's analysis went beyond the necessity of giving
school officials the right to proceed for purposes of school ·rules and
discipline. Instead,
the Court gave school officials the right to search on
.
suspicion of breaking the law, especially drug laws, and thereby deputized
school officials to search out student law-breakers while sparing them ''the
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause and
pennit[ting] them to regulate their conduct according to the dictates of
144
reason and common sense."
Whether intended or not, the Court
conflated law enforcement with school discipline and gave school officials
an ex~a-institutional capacity to become law enforcement officers while

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

at 336-37.
at 340.
at 337.
at 339.
at 338.
at 341.
!d. at 342.
/d.
/d. at 343.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.
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simultaneously lowering students'. constitutional protections,
especially
in
.
cases involving drugs. By the time the student drug testing cases reached
the Court, the pump was already primed to allow school officials to
exercise that huge extension of extra-institutional authority.
In the meantim~, the War on Drugs . particularly as President George
H. W. Bush ratcheted up the war rhetoric was becoming a near-obsession
in some corners
of
the
federal
government.
Hardly
surprising,
then,
was
the
.
Supreme Court's employment of similar nearly hysteric rhetoric. For
instance, when the Custom Service's employee drug-testing program was
challenged by the employees' union, the CoUrt majority relied on hortatory
language in its favor:
•

The Customs Service is our Nation's first line of defense against one of
the greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our population.
We ·have adverted before to ''the veritable national crisis in law
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics." ... This national
interest in self-protection coul~ be irreparably damaged if those charged
with safeguarding it were, because of their own drug use, unsympathetic
145
. to their niission of interdicting narcotics.

•

The Court ha4 not far to travel to rely on these exigencies of war to suspend
children's civil. rights in. service to those exigencies. ·
The genesis of the Vernonia community's and · school's decision to
146
mandate urinalysis on its student-athlet~s was its "drug problem."
Discipline problems in the schools were attributed both to drug use and to a
systemic acceptance ·o f the drug culture among ~tudents, especially the
athletes. All evidence pointed to the school district's attempting to solve
the problem itself; there is no mention of referring students to the police or

•

145. Nat'l Treas. Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668, 670 (1990). Justice Scalia,
dissenting in Von Raab, described these invocations of national disaster as insufficient to support
the employee drug testing in the Customs Service. ld. at 682. Similar "reasoning" was used to
uphold highway sobriety checkpoints in Michigan Dep 't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444

(1990). In the face of evidence in the record that such checkpoints are ineffective, the majority
relied on similarly purple prose as the Von Raab court:
No one can seriously dispute the magnitude of the drunken driving problem or the
States' interest in eradicating it. Media reports of alcohol-related death and mutilation
on the Nation's roads are legion.
The anecdotal is confinned by the
statistical. ... "The increasing slaughter on our highways ... now reaches the
·
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield."
ld. at 449, 451. The Court eventually dete1mined that a 1.6% arrest rate was sufficient empirical
evidence to deem the program effective. ld. at 455. Arrest rates, however, were not the state's
interest; curbing drunk driving was. Id. at 449. The state had presented no evidence of the latter.
See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (state failed to show any significant
contribution to highway safety by having license and registration checkpoints).
146. Ve1nonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-49 (1995) .
•

•
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the juvenile .authorities: Instead, the · co~unity apparently tasked the
147
school district with fixing the "problem."
The school district chose
148
warrantless drug testing on all its athletes as the solution to that problem.
A seventh-grade student who wanted to try out for football challenged the
49
150
school district's policy! He lost.
The Court did not treat these searches as being procedures arising
from suspicions of violating either a school rule or the law, but instead as
151
"custodial and tutelary."
These were searches "undertaken for
prophylactic and distinctly nonpunitive purposes (protecting student
152
athletes from injury, and deterring drug use in the student population)."
Indeed, the test results were to be kept in-house without referral to law
enforcement; however, a punitive aspect did exist: students who tested
153
positive were suspended from athletic participation.
In any event, these
"custodial and tutelary" searches were part and parcel of the War on Drugs:
"Deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is at least as important
as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
154
importation of drugs."
The weakest citizens were entitled to protection
from that War because "the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the
. fact that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but upon
children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility of care and
155
direction."
Because these searches were for "protection" only, school.
officials no longer needed even a reasonable suspicion of drug use at all.
To rule otherwise, according to the Court; would add "to the everexpanding diversionary duties of schoolteachers the new function of

•

•

•

•

147. /d. The evidence was undisputed that the local high school was experiencing a serious discipline
problem attributable to a combination of drugs and alcohol with their glamorization by studentathletes lionized by a community with limited entertainment options. Acton v. V etnonia School
Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356 (D. Ore. 1992). "The coincidence of an almost three-fold
increase in classroom disruptions and disciplinary reports along with the staff's direct
observations of students using drugs or glamorizing drug and alcohol use led the administration to
the inescapable conclusion that the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well
as the student[s'] misperceptions about the drug culture." /d. at 1357. Although the
administration had considered mass expulsion, the opinions reveal no evidence that law
enforcement was engaged. Urinalysis was considered a "less drastic alternative" to other
disciplinary measures. /d. at 1358.
148. Id. The empirical evidence shows that student drug-testing is an ineffective method for curbing
drug use and, in some cases, may increase student drug use, See generally Susan Stuart, When the
Cure is Worse than the Disease: Student Random Drug Testing & Its Empirical Failure, 44 VAL.
U. L. REV. 1055 (2010).
149 Vernonia School Dist. 47J, 515 U.S. at 651.
150 /d.
151. /d. at 656.
152. /d. at 658 n.2 (ernphasis in original).
153. /d. at 651.
154. /d. at 661.
155. /d. at 662.
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spotting and bringing to account drug abuse, a task for which they are ill
156
prepared, and which is not readily compatible with their vocation."
Insofar as the Vernonia community agreed with the school district's
157
po}icy, the local CitizenS Were COmplicit in reducing their Children'S CiVil
rights in exchange for outsourcing an essentially law enforcemen~ function
158
to the schools.
Then the Court was faced with a challenge to a urinalysis policy in a
.school district without a distinguishable drug problem but in which all
· students who engaged in extracurricular activities not just athletes were
159
subject to random drug-testing.
The Court no longer needed to posit any
· other justification for these tests than the special needs of the school
160
environment, but the Court characterized those "special needs" in a way
that suggests it was supporting the school district's War effort. Indeed, the
Court's analysis of the state interest sufficient to justify the intrusion on the
students' Fourth Amendment privacy interests was significantly juxtaposed
in the context of the War: "The drug abuse problem among our Nation's
youth has hardly abated since Vernonia: was decided in 1995. In fact,
evidence suggests that it has only grown worse.... Indeed, the nationwide
·drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a ·pressing concern in every
161
school."
· Perhaps nowhere did Court so completely embrace its mission in the
War on Drugs a~d face such a forinidable juvenile enemy ·as in Morse ·v.
162
Frederick. · In that case, a principal disciplined a high school student who
erected a banner that read "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" while television crews
163
followed the Olympic Torch Relay through Juneau, Alaska.
In the face
of the student's challenge under the First Amendment, the Court. carved out
•

•

•

•

156. /d. at 664.
157. /d. at 665.
158. A follow-up to assess the Vernonia school policy's success yielded only vague statements that
drug use seemed to decrease and discipline seemed to improve. Ryoko Yamaguchi, Lloyd D.
Johnston, & Patrick M. O'Malley, Youth, Educ. & Soc'y, YES Occasional Papers No.2: Drug
Testing in Schools: Policies, Practices. and Association with Student Drug Use 1 (2003)
[hereinafter Yamaguchi Yes].
159. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cnty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826
(2002).
160. /d. at 829.
161. /d. at 834. This theme played out similarly in Justice Thomas's dissent in Safford Unified School
District #I, where he quoted this passage in Earls as the rule of law, rather than merely a piece of
"evidence." Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.. 2633, 2657 (2009).
Thomas thereby converted a piece of evidence into a legal presumption of the state's interest,
virtually eliminating the state's burden of proof and preordaining the loss of students'
constitutional rights.
162. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
163. /d. at 397.
•
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•
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an exception to students' freedom of speech· for messages that advocate
164
Regardless of whether or not this banner was a message
illegal drug use.
that actually advocated illegal drug use rather than adolescent gibberish
designed to attract the attention of television cameras, the Court apparently
. believed that this speech was disruptive and that it impennissibly interfered
165
To reach that conclusion, the
with the school's educational function.
. Court extrapolated . the content of the speech as the disruption and
impennissible interference, rather .than the manner and location of the
speech. The Court was offended by the drug-related nature of the speech
rather than by any actual impact it had on the educational function. By·
making that leap, the Court stood shoulder-to-shoulder with other drug
warriors to assist school officials . who were mandated to engage in certain
combat tactics by the government in the War on Drugs:
•

The problem remains serious today... :Congress has declared that part of
a school's job is educating students
about
the
dangers
of
illegal
drug
use
.
.
It has provided billions of dollars to support state and local drug-.
prevention programs ... and required that schools receiving federal funds
under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994
a
clear
and
consistent
certify that their drug-prevention programs ·" convey
.
message that . .. the illegal use of drugs [is] wrong and
harmful." ... Thousands of school boards throughout the countryincluding
JDHS
have
adopted
policies
aimed
at
·
effectuating
this
.
message.... Those school boards kno\v that peer pressure is perhaps "the
single most imp~rtant factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs," and
that students are more likely to use drugs when the norms in school appear
to tolerate such behavior.. ·.. .Student speech celebrating illegal drug use
at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers,
thus poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect
166
those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.

•

.

The Court delivered quite a blow to student civil rights with that
decision, choosing . to suspend the Constitution in service to the War on
Drugs. No one had told · the Justices that these combat tactics have no
167
But at least the Court had early identified a specific
measurable success.
enemy in the War on Drugs, and a formidable enemy it has proved to be.

164.
165.
166.
167.

!d. at 403.
ld. at 401,405,408.
!d. at 407-08 (citations omitted).
The U.S "government has spent $33 Billion in marketing 'Just Say No' -style messages to

America's youth and other prevention programs. High school students report the same rates of
illegal drug use as they did in 1970, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention says drug
overdoses have 'risen steadily' since the early 1970s to more than 20,000" in 2009. Martha
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The insidious problem with a war on an intangible or abstract concept
169
is identifying the enemy.
As the War on Drugs progressed from the
Nixon presidency to today, identifying a specific enemy on whom to
declare War proved rather elusive, especially ·if the · public were to be
engaged in combat with an enemy that threatened the nation. A nation
cannot engage with plants and pharmac~uticals. In concretizing that
abstraction, the enemy was caricatured in different ways, depending up-on
the political or social framing of the War. But even from the outset, the
War was caricaturized as an "us-versus-them" phenomenon. The targets
may change, but the cause remained the same: The nation was being
threatened by "them." The problem with that framing is that students are
both "us" and "them."
Otherness pervaded early drug control efforts in the U.S., usually due
170
to racism. Thus, early goverrunent anti-drug efforts stigmatized drug use
by playing on ·racial characteristics and stereotypes: opium use was
171
17
negatively ()Ssociated with the Chinese while cocaine ~ and marijuana
173
use was negatively associated with African-Americans and Mexicans,
implying that '~real" Americans were being threatened by outsi4ers. Thus,
prohibiting opium use was but one of several weapons to· ~arginalize
Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as
..

168.

169.

170.
171.
172.

173.

•

Mendoza,
U.S.
Drog War Has Met None of Its
Goals,
MSNBC.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3 7134751/ns/us_news-security/ (last updated May 13, 201 0).
S.E. HINTON, THE OUTSIDERS (Viking 2007). S.E. Hinton's best-selling and award-winning
young adult novel focused on the violent conflict between the Socials and the Greasers, but
particularly focused on the social alienation of the Greasers: "It was too vast a problem to be just a
personal thing." ·ld. at 187; see also Dale Peck, 'The Outsiders': 40 Years Later, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 23, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/23/books/review/Peck -t.html.
"Insofar as the war[) on ... drugs [is] treated as [a war] on conditions, [it], like the wars on cancer
and (in general) poverty must, of course, be seen as wholly metaphorical, for one cannot, of
course, declare a literal war on a condition." Jeremy E~ins, The Model of War, 38 POL. THEORY
214, 227 (2010); "Anything waged against a shapeless, intangible noun can never truly be won."
Suddath, supra note 77.
·
MORONE, supra note 14, at 464--65.
GLASSNER, supra note 24, at 135.
"In 1914, The New York Times reported that cocaine caused blacks to commit 'violent crimes,'
and that it made them resistant to police bullets." Mendoza, supra note 167; MORONE, supra
notel4, at 465.
.
ERNEST L. ABEL, MARUUANA: THE FIRST TwELVE 'fiiOUSAND YEARS 217-22 (1980), available
at http://www.druglibrary.org/Schafferlhemplhistory/firstl2000/12.htm. The higher penalties for
crack use than for powder cocaine u~e have also led to higher arrests rates of African-Americans,
whose communities tend to favor crack. Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to "War
on
Drugs,"
WALL
Sr.
J.,
May
14,
2009,
at
A3,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124224891527617 397.html.
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•

they competed, quite successfully, with white Americans in the economy.
Jim Crow laws presaged attacks on African-Americans' cocaine use while
the Great pepression saw an increasingly hysterical connection between
175
Any number of social, cultural, nativistic,
marijuana use and Mexicans.
or perhaps tribal impulses could be to blame although the actual source is
likely as simple as the founding Puritan notion that we can only define
ourselves as U. S. citizens by contrasting ourselves with those who we are
176
not.
But the approach to attributing drug abuse., and therefore bad
behavior, to "others" runs long and deep. President Nixon mined those
impulses when he launched the War on Drugs.
Nixon's job was to persuade the country to cooperate in his efforts to
fight drug abuse. His job was complicated by the fact that recreational drug
use had gone mainstream. Young people discovered marijuana does not
177
have the deleterious effects that had so thoroughly terrified their parents:
178
They would not die, become pregnant, or go insane. An abstract message
to the country that drug use had health consequences and a significant.
impact on crime, while true, did not have high marketing value. Nor did a
message '?f morality: . Such a message had not worked out so well during
the Prohibition, and similar tactics have been a disaster for teen sexual
activity. In addition, Nixon was in the midst of trying to end the Vietnam
War as favorably as possible, especially in the face of the rising anti-war
179
movement So Nixon conjoined them.
·
President Nixon discovered that he- could move the body politic to
action if he associated this explosion in drug use with the anti-war protest
movement. If Nixon could marginalize the~e users many of whom were
teenagers and could not vote yet then he could recruit allies in the "silent
majority" who remained afraid and abstinent. Nixon consciously linked the
drug problem in the U.S. with Vietnam i~selt: indeed with the fate of the
Nation: "When I look at the history of great civilizations in the past, many
of them have gone down this road and they slip into basically the drug
psychology, the drug society; it is terribly destructive of the character of
.

.

•

.

•

supra note 10, at 75-80.
MORONE, supra note 14, at 46~6.
MORONE, supra note 14 at 54, 55-59.
Musto, supra note 11.
178. Reefer Madness is_perhaps the most easily derided of the religious prohibitionists'
efforts
to
make
.
children "Just Say No." The film was intended as a morality tale entitled Tell Your Children.
While "addicted" to marijuana, the film's characters die, become sexually promiscuous, and go
insane. Kevin Murphy & Dan Studney, Reefer Madness History, http://web.archive.org/web/
20060328163318/http:/Lwww.reefer-madness-movie.comlhistory.html.
Modem teenagers
laughed and made the movie a cult hit
179. Mendoza, s1.1pra note 167.

174.
175.
176.
177.

SZASZ,

.
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180

•

that nation." . Blaming· some of the problems in Vietnam itself on the
181
drug-addled condition of the servicemen was also convenient.
Nixon's
marginalization of GI heroin users alternatively framed the problem as a
"drugs-as-disease metaphor," the contagion of which threatened national
182
security.
He thereby constructed an identity of the "other" who was to
blame for the U.S.'s drug problem as well as its foreign policy problems, an
183
identity of an "other" . that was un-American and could not be tolerated.
This "other" also fit well into Nixon's stabbed-in-the-back narrative for the
184
failures in Vietnam.
Perhaps just as significantly, it fit well into a quasireligious assault on the legacy of the 1960s, during which niinorities,
185
women, the poor, and the elderly "others" won significant civil rights.
President Reagan, in particular, perpetuated Nixon's ''us-versus-them"
paradigm of the War but made it a political as well as national security
statement by tagging "them" as liberals and hippies out to destroy America.
He was in the vanguard of those wanting to roll back civil rights success, so
he blamed the era and reached back to blame the youth of the 1960s for
perpetuating his own presidency's drug problems in the I 980s:

•

.

We know there are a large number of individuals, primarily those who
acquired their drug-use habits in the sixties and seventies, who persist in
using illegal drugs. And this persistent demand for illegal drugs is met by
sometimes seemingly limitless supply. But a $urge in drug-related crimes,
•

• •

180. President Richard Nixon, Remarks at a White House Conference on Drug Abuse (Oct. 14, 1970),
available at http://www .presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2719.
.
181. JEREMY KUZMAROV, THE MYTH OF THE ADDICTED ARMY: VIETNAM AND THE MODERN WAR ON
DRUGS 6 (2009). "The myth of the addicted army ... helped to skew public memory of the
Vietnam War by advancing the impression that pure and innocent American youth had been
corrupted by illegal drugs not by flawed policies, institutional failings, or cultural chauvinism,
as most historians would conclude." /d. President Nixon and Vice President Spiro Agnew
similarly attempted to ascribe the failure in the Vietnam War on the insidious effect anti-war
activists had on returning servicemen by spitting on them. That myth persists to this day, despite
the absence of evidence that any such incidents occurred. JERRY LEMBCKE, THE SPn"I'ING IMAGE:
MYTH, MEMORY AND THE LEGACY OF VIETNAM 71-76 (1998); see also KUZMAROV, supra, at 7.
Nixon and Agnew were marketing masters.
182. Daniel Weimer, Drugs-as-a-Disease: Heroin. Metaphors, and Jqentity in Nixon's Drug War, 6
JANUS HEAD 260,262 (2003), available at www.janushead.org/6-2/Wiemer.pdf.
183. !d. at 265. "Ensconced in a culture of fear, the public was falsely imbued with the impression that
America's social fabric was being tom apart at the seams by half-crazed and doped-up soldiers
from whom nobody was safe." Jeremy Kuzrnarov, From Counter-Insurgency to NarcoInsurgency: Vietnam and the International War on Drogs, 20 J. OF POL'YHIST. 344, 348 (2008).
184. Kevin Baker, Stabbed in the Back! The Past and Future of a Right-Wing Myth, HARPER'S
BAZAAR, June 2006, www.harpers.org/archive/2006/06/0081 080.
185. MORONE, supra note 14, at 445, 452.
"The assault on the sixties has succeeded
brilliantly.... [B]ut at its height, men and women stood up courageously for the American
dream•... The movement's victories America's democratic legacies~me at great sacrifice
and with enormous courage." /d. at 445.
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deaths by overdose, births of drug-addicted and drug-impaired babies, and
even the destabilization of national governments by traffickers should not
be viewed as harbingers of defeat in our war on drugs. These events
should instead strengthen our resolve to stop this insidious evil once and
186
for all.
•

Reagan thereby characterized "us" as ''America," and exhorted that no less
than our constitutional integrity d~manded that the War on Drugs be a
necessary war:
•

So, this is my message to you today: to hold the torch high, to stay in the
battle. Too much is left to do. The battle is far from over. And all is yet
to win or lose. But we stand with the founders of our nation in this
ongoing struggle to protect our freedom. Thomas Jefferson reminded us
that "Our pec':lliar security is in the possession of a written Constitution."
And he implored, "Let us not make it a blank paper by construction." For
as James Madison wrote, if" ... the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the Nation is not the guide to expounding
it ... there can be no security for a faithful exercise of its powers." It was
187
true then. It is true ·now. It will be true always.

•

•

President .Reagan clearly had not gotten the message that drug use crosses
188
politicallines.
Thus, the early political bandwagon to drum up support for the War
on Drugs was "us" (real Americans) against some vague "them,'' typically
189
For Nixon, the enemies were
political, racial or cultural outsiders.
African-Americans, the political left, and hippies. For Reagan, the War
focused on the racial underclass whereas President George H.W. Bush's
War took on a moralistic view that waged battle on those who were "more
dependent, less fulfilled, lacking in 'social currency,' as well as those who
do not accept the model of sober autonomy on which 'our nation's notion
190
of liberty is rooted.'"
"Real" Americans were not only recruited to
combat the enemies, they were to be protected from these enemies.
Middle-class users were considered benign or even victims of the aggressor

186. Remarks to Media Executives at a White House Briefing on Drug Abuse, supra note 35. See also
Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, supra note 128 (''The
liberals have scoffed when rve said we're winning the war on drugs.").
187. Remarks to the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, supra note 128.
188. Politicians' Children's Encounters with Marijuana Prohibition, NAT'L ORG. FOR REFORM OF
MARUUANA LAWS (July 6, 2000), http://norml.org/pdf_files/NORML_politicians_childrens_
arrests. pdf; Tokin' Politics, NAT'L ORO. FOR REFORM OF MARUUANA LAWS,
http://norml.org/index.cfin?Group_ID=3461 (last visited Sept. 29, 2011).
189. Elkins, supra note 166, at 224.
190. /d. at 226.
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outsiders! , ·Thus, N~ncy Reag~n's Just Say· No clubs were especialiy
192
designed to target white, middle-class children.
The patriotic fervor in waging the War of Drugs received a huge boost
after the attacks of September 11. Regardless .o f whether terrorist groups
193
have been. funded solely by illegal drug trafficking . or perhaps even
194
partially financed by U.S. drug policy itself, the connection became the
official government meme because· of the attacks on the World Trade
195
Center. The DEA called it Narco-Terrorism.
Indeed, the DEA
Adtninistrator, Asa Hutchinson, described September II as a great
marketing tool in theW~ on Drugs:·
91

·

'

'

This is a great opportunity for us to focus our country on the extraordinary
connection between drugs and terrorism. When President Bush asked me
to head up the DEA about 3 months ago, after I was confirtned, I did not
anticipate that the events of September 11, of course, would even occur,
but how it would significantly . change the viewpoint of America and the
attitude. of our country toward· drugs and how it would shape America's
196
view of our nation's fight against drugs.

Perhaps more insidious, however, was the political coupling of adolescent
drug use in the U.S. to terrorism:
·
·
.

.

'

..

.

Now. we potenti~lly are going to see, much like I had mentioned, if a
· student does illegal activity and illegal smoking as a teenager at sch9ol,

·

..

191. /d. at 226. At the height of the War,. one drug warrior suggested that recreational drug users
should be shot as traitors. !d. at 227.
192. Frontline Chronology, supra note 18.
193. Sheldon Richman, The Drug War and Terrorism, FREEDOM DAILY (Jan. 2002),
www.fff.org/freedom/fd020 ld.asp.
It has long been known that violent groups in Latin America have-made money by
protecting coca farmers from government agents, both American and indigenous.
It
.
.
should come as no surprise to learn that the same happens in Central Asia and the
Middle East. It is certainly no surprise to the American authorities. They paid the
Taliban in Afghanistan millions of dollars before September 11 to stem the growing of
poppies for heroin. The Taliban is reported to have obliged; but the lost heroin is
reported to have been made up by the Northern Alliance, the U.S. government's new
allies.
Id. See also Kevin B. Zeese, Drug Terror Link Shows Sloppy Thinking of Drug War Advocates,
NAACOTERROR.ORG, www.narcoterr,or.org/kzoped0202~htrn (last updated July 16, 2009).
194~ Richman, supra note 193.
195. Steven W. Casteel, Assistant for Intelligence, U.S. Dep't. of Just., Drug Enforcement Admin.,
Testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Narco-Terrorism (May 20;
2003 ), available at http://www.justice.gov/dealpubslcngrtest/ ct052003 .htinl.
196. Asa Hutchison, Administrator, Drug Enforcement Agency, Remarks During a National
Symposium on Narco-Terrorism Entitled Target America: Traffickers, Terrorists & Your Kids
(Dec. 4, 2001 ), available at http://www. targetamerica.orgldownloads/symposium_transcript.pdf.
•

•

•

•

2011]

•

War as Metaphor

35
•

•

.

· · · that he is likely ·to do iJlt~gal alcohol, and if he starts to do that, .he's going
to be exposed to other illegal activities. Our big concern in this area is
we're going to see the interconnectedness of international terrorist
197
organizations.

•

The implications of this coupling are rather horrifying, that our children are
terrorists if they abuse drugs.
In absorbing this militaristic marketing strategy, schools ar~ not
entirely to blame. At the very least, qualifying for federal and state funds to
deal with the problems required them tQ ·do so. More culpably, school
officials could consider themselves part of a greater national security event,
especially with the support of the Supreme Court cases; simplistic legal
principles espoused by the Court are easier to apply than to reconsider them
198
in the context of education theory and policy.
But schools should have
known better than to make students the enemy. The educational dynamic
between educators and adolescents is always "us-versus-them." Teens
always view themselves as the "others." They pride themselves on that
identification as ·a rite of passage to adulthood. When schools began
actively targeting their students as the enemy in the War on Drugs, they
militarized the conflict unnecessarily. The irony is-that, after all is said and
done, schools have nothing positive to show for .that characterization: no
significant reduction in drug use in the schools, no trust between school
administrators and their charges, and no civil rights for students.
V. LORD OF THE FLIES

199

The War on Drugs' marketing strategy through militarized rhetoric
worked. All branches of govenunent sold the emotional message by
incessant repetition, and the public with little self-reflection bought the
~litarization of the message as the means to an end: If we treat this effort
as a War, then the drug problem will disappear. We did not stop to
consider that the abstract would have to be made real, that we would be
declaring war on their children as among "others," including terrorists.

197. Former Congressman Mark Souder, Remarks During a National Symposium on Narco-Terrorism
Entitled Target America: Traffickers, Tenorists & Your Kids (Dec. 4, 2001 ), available at
http://www. targetamerica.org/downloadslsymposium_transcript. pdf.
198. See, e.g., Robert G. Fraser, Student Discipline from the Perspective of the School Attorney, 34
NEW ENG. L. REv. 573 (1999-2000).
199. WILLIAM GoLDING, LoRD OF THE FLIES (A Perigee Book 2003). Another influential novel that is
often taught in high school classes, Lord of the Flies is set in war-time when a group of British
school-boys is stranded on an island. It is, ultimately, about democracy and dictatorship. Jd. at ix
(Introduction by E.M. Forster). Golding himself describes the following theme: "The moral is
that the shape of a society must depend on the ethical nature of the individual and not on any
political system however apparently logical or respectable." /d. at 290.
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. Hence, the marketing strategy shifted from the metaphorical ·to the literal
and sustained the War on Drugs for forty years. It persuaded Congress and
state legisla~es to disgorge billions of dollars for worthless campaigns and
useless annament. It persuaded courts to curtail the rights of students
because we were at war. And, oh so tragically, that war first targeted our
servicemen in Vietnam, many of whom are still struggling today under the
stigma of being failures as warriors in a very real war, with very re~l bodies
and very real trauma.
After forty years, perhaps facts and conunon sense have won out:
the
.
Obama Presidency is trying to address the nation's drug problems through
prevention and treatment. The National Drug Control Strategy 2010 is
200
focusing on small steps to change the War into a public health issue.
But
where one War ends, another War is sure to· follow: War abhors a
201
vacuum. And that axiom leads to the current conundrum.
The rhetorical excesses of the War on Drugs are continuing, but now
we are iricreasingly comfortable with the metaphorical becoming literal.
The militarized rhetoric that pundits and politicians are using includes the
same expli~it words and images used during the War on Drugs, and they are
whipping up a frenzy using the same paradigm: This health and social
problem is a war of"us-versus-them." Presidents Nixon,_Reagan, and H.W.
Bush were wildly
successful
at
marketing
the
War
on
Drugs
as
an
"us.
against~them" proposition, neglecting to mention, of co:urse, that "us" had
202
But the point ·o f that rhetoric in the
the same drug problems as "them."
War on Drugs was to market a product and recruit soldiers. The. War may
have been misbegotten, but it started with a l~gitimate enemy, drug abuse.
At the outset, "us-versus-them" militarize_d rhetoric was the pathos, but it'
was not the logos. By mid-war, however, the federal government had used
the powerful engine of our rule of law to identify children as the enemy.
Today, the militarized rhetoric has skipped the abstraction and
individualized the enemy each other without a moral reason in sight for
doing so.
•

•

•

•

•

200.

2010 (May 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-researchlndcs2010_0.pdf.
Furthermore, the new proposal for ESEA's reauthorization still includes drug-free schools
provisions but emphasizes safe, successful and healthy students rather than law enforcement.
U.S. DEP'T. OF EDUC., A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
AND
SECONDARY
EDUCATION
ACT
(2010),
available
at
ELEMENTARY
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leglbluprintlblueprint.pdf.
201. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 14.
202. See, e.g., Jay P. Greene & Greg Forster, Sex, Drogs, and Delinquency in Urban and Suburban
Public Schools (Manhattan Inst. Educ., Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/htmVewp_ 04.htm.
THE WHITE HOUSE, NAT'L DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY
•

•
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The United States h·as a long history of manipulating "othemes~,,· as a
way of creating unity, especially of the ruling majority. ''The goal of
such ... rhetoric is to invoke pity for one's own. The goal is to show the
community that what they hold sacred is under threat. The enemy, we are
told, seeks to destroy religious and cultural life, the very identity of the
203
group or state."
Similarly did Hannah Arendt explain of totalitarianism:
''The principle of the movement is whoever is not included is excluded,
whoever is not with me is against .me, so the world loses all the nuances and
204
pluralistic aspects that have become too confusing for the masses."
So,
today, "us, is engaged in a war with "them."
This '''civil" war has been denominated the Culture War. It is a war
205
being "fought to defeat one's cultural enemies."
Although pundits and.
politicians may insist that this characterization of the social dispute is a
mere abstraction for which war as metaphor is acceptably employed, a
Culture War seeks· the destruction of its opponents. This is war for war's
sake: "[Q]ulture war rhetoric is aimed not at offering an effective proof for
the benefit of the opposition, but in destroying the opposition. Because
proof is not its aim or its concern~ culture war rhetoric has no· allegiance to
206
the truth." This battle is no longer a war on an abstraction because
pundit~ and politicians have learned, through the War on Drugs experience,
that the audience will accept, condone, and encourage the metamorphosis of
a metaphorical war on an abstraction to a literal one t~at harms our "real"
enemies. If;we would do this to children, we can certainly do it to adults.
The politicians' and pundits' response· to such criticism is that the
Culture War rhetoric· has not actually crossed the line: "We did not mean
that; the listener must have misunderstood; or the listener was mentally
unstable." But the listener did not misunderstand; the listener believed
because he or she was immune to the subtleties that the politicians and
pundits assert after· the fact. If politicians' rhetoric is militaristic, the
natural impulse in the United States is to take up arms. Past rhetorical
excesses have made the listener unable to discern that current rhetoric does
not ~ean exactly what the politicians and pundits say: Today's language of
war no longer carries an implied message not to act. No longer does a
metaphorical filter to the direct words of battle exist, and America's past
experience in the W·ar on Drugs has inured people from reflecting on the
morality of those words.

•

.•

•

..

203. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 15.
204. HEDGES~ supra note 8, at 15 .
205. Kyle R. Cupp, Culture War Rhetoric, Vox NOVA (Feb.
nova.com/20 11102/14/culture-war-rhetoric/.
206. ld.
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The War on Drugs, among other "just" wars of public policy, has
deafened citizens to the ethical uses of war as metaphor: "In debating
social policy through the language of war, we often forget the moral reality
207
of war."
One of those moral realities is that a war requires justification.
"[A] moral presumption against war [exists] because of the important
208
individual and social duty not to kill others." _ But when exhorted intowar, today's civilian can no longer discern the distinction between a
metaphorical war in ~hich he might engage and a literal war for which
should not. Nor do today's civilians understand the "formalities" of war .
. ·They do not understand that "[o]rganized killing.. :. [is] done best by a
209
disciplined, professional anny."
Today's civilians have not incorporated
the moral imperative that the just warrior is to "[e]riter reluctantly, fight
210
fairly, and restore the peace as soon as possible."
Instead, a Culture War
imbues the warrior with a "dangerous mentality of crusade or holy
war ... that right' makes might of any kind acceptable[,] ... neglect[ing]
such constraints as right intention, discrimination, · and proportionality,
211
which protect the humanity of all parties in war. "
The oh-so~successful
marketing tactics that Nixon started,. that Reagan. ene~gized, and that the
Bushes sent into the stratosphere to support a Forty-Years War are now
employed with little or no self-reflection, and certainly no justification nor
212
ethical consideration.
·
Because of that lack of self-reflection
on
the
use
of
war
rhetoric
in
the
.
.
Culture War, we trivialize both actual war and the source of that War: the
213
debate about America's national identity.
War rhetoric does not engage
the debate; it inhibits the debate. "The metaphor of warfare highlights the
conflict involved in argument, but it hides the cooperation and
collaboration, involving shared rules, that are also indispensable to
214
argument."
This fact holds especially true if either side of the "debate"
has no proof to establish the rightness of its position. Instead, the
militarized rhetoric simply solidifies and magnifies the pathos but not the
·
logos, because no logos exists.
Instead of civilized debate, we simply have militarized rhetoric that is
not designed to inform but to inflame, because "us" must out-recruit "them"
to prevaiL "Us" must recruit members because "us" wants "to grow

207. Childress, supra note 3, at 181.
208. /d. at 182.
209. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 9.
210. Childress, supra note 3, at 183.
211. Id. at 181.
.
212. /d. at 193.
213. !d. at 193-94.
214. /d. at 184.
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indefinitely and what it needs for this is more and more people."
Inflammatory, militarized rhetoric is particularly useful in recruiting
because anger is an important attribute in the taking of sides:
One of the most striking traits of the inner life of a crowd is the feeling of
being persecuted, a peculiar angry sensitiveness and irritability directed
against those it has once and forever nominated as enemies. These can
behave in any manner, harsh or conciliatory, cold or sympathetic, severe
or mild whatever they do will be interpreted as springing from an
unshakable malevolence, a premeditated intention to destroy the crowd,
216
openly or by stealth.
•

•

Worse, the crowd destroys civil society; it loves destruction for the
sake of its growth and even for its raison d,etre:
•

•

•
•

•

The destructiveness of the crowd is often mentioned as its most
conspicuous quality . . . . The crowd particularly likes .destroying houses
and objects: breakable objects like window panes, mirrors, pictures and
crockery; and people tend to think that it is the fragility of these objects
217
which stimulates the destructiveness of the crowd.
.

When war, and not just destruction, is its organizing principle, the crowd
can erupt into actual war:
·
·
War is an astonishing business. People decide that they are threatened
with physical destruction and proclaim the fact publicly to the whole
world. They say 'I can be killed', and secretly add 'because I myself want
to kill this or that man.' ... Even if in fact the aggressor, each side will
218
always attempt to prove that it is threatened.

•

•

Sadly, metaphorical war is successful in the United States because
· "[w]ar makes the world understandable, a black and white tableau of them
and us. It suspends thought, especially self-critical thought. All bow
219
before the supreme effort. We are one." ·1n addition to a modem identity
that accepts war because we are no longer sensitive to its images, we
become desensitized to its moral problems. War becomes trivial rather than

215. ELIAS CANEITI, CROWDS AND POWER, 20 (Carol Stewart trans., The Noonday Press 1984).
216. !d. at 22. "In order to understand this feeling of hostility and persecution it is necessary to start
from the basic fact that the crowd, once fotmed, wants to grow rapidly. It is difficult to
exaggerate the power and detet ruination with which it spreads." /d. at 23.
217. /d. at 19.
218. Jd. at 71-72.
219. HEDGES, supra note 8, at I 0.
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exceptional.
"Once we _sign on for war's crusade, once we ~ee oUrselves
on the side of the angels, once we embrace a theological or ideological
belief system that defmes itself as the embodiment of goodness and light, it
221
is only a matter of how we will carry out murder."
As the fable of The
Lord of the Flies implies, ~an may be ineluctably drawn to savagery
because he "loves adventure, excitement, foraging in groups, ... and · he
222
loves shedding blood."
With our failure to confront the moral problems
of the Culture War and allowing it to become literal, we are no longer .the
223
moral force that can restrain those naturally inclined to violence.
·
One of the most tragic consequences .of the goverr101ent's assault on
children in the War on Drugs is what it has done to the institution that
might otherwise teach the moral lessons about war. When schools became
the battleground, Congress and the Court used the rule of law to turn
schools from institutions that should teach students about their role in
democracy to institutions that teach students to be passive observers in the
loss of their constitutional rights. Marketing messages are hard to rid
oneself of, like those little tunes or advertising jingles earworms-that we
just cannot seem to get out of our heads. We remember those and embrace
them without otherwise thinking about their factual basis. Marketing
messages also require a comtnitment . to the message: That cotttmitment
was wholly embraced in schools with certain regiqnal, religious, and
authoritarian attitudes, not unlike those that have enlisted in the Culture
War. Thus, certain school ·districts have wholly favored this war effort over
the educational fate of their students, and they have communicated to their
students that schools are not to be trusted bu~ that their greatest asset is to
be feared. Long-term, schoolchildren hear the message that principles of
democracy do not apply to them, a . message conutlunicated by the
institution that has long been entrusted with teaching those principles. The
past three or four generations of schoolchildren have heard the following
message from schools: your rights as citizens are not nearly as important as
our war efforts. Militarized rhetoric transformed a war against an
abstraction into a war against actual chlldren and the very survival of
America's rule of law in time of war. Nearly as bad are those students who
have accepted their substand~d status. After all, they are warriors. And
220

'

'

220. Childress, supra note 3, at 195.
221. HEDGES, supra note 8, at 9.
222. GOLDING, supra note 199, at ix.

•

223. See, e.g., HEDGES, supra note 8, at 84, 87.
"These militias [in Bosnia and Kosovo], without the discipline or military code of the professional
soldier, were frightening. They were populated with criminals, misfits, and children who drive
around with car trunks full of weapons they did not know how to use. They killed and tortured
according to whims and moods." ld. at 105~
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War is hell.
Equally as bad is the prospect that, by internalizing
metaphorical war as a legitimate mechanism for discourse and for resolving
disputes, children are actually teaming_to perpetuate war. Jack, Piggy, and
Ralph were just children, but they had to forrn their own society: one
225
represented democracy; the other anarchy.
In the absence of any other
guidance, a pig's head on a stick makes as much sense as· a totem of
civilization for children as what occurred to them in the War on Drugs.
Last, the· War on Drugs taught Americans that even metaphorical
militarization will adversely affect the rule of law. As is becoming
increasingly apparent, legislatUres all over the country are passing laws to
·align with the rhetoric, laws that will affect '''them" and not "us." Hence,
Arizona feels free to pass a statute that allows law enforcement to stop and
226
ask for documentation of citizenship or alien status. Oklahoma is passing
227
laws forbidding the consideration of Sharia law in any judicial decision.
Other states Wisconsin, Ohio, and Indiana have considered legislation
to bar collective bargaining rights to either public or private employee
unions on the grounds that unions represent ''them," not "us": ''[T]he most
powerful special interest in . America today are the government
unions.... Some of the money is siphoned into. political union dues, goes
back into politics and elects people who will vote for more and more and
228
more."
But the militarized rhetoric of ''us" empowers listeners to accept
the credo that. disagreement begets violence, thus prompting one citizen to
argue that any legitimate protests that this legislation might spark among
229
"them" should be greeted with "live ammunition."
224

•
•

•

•

224. "My school is considering drug tests .. ~. Certainly, we value our freedom. But if there's one
thing we've learned ... , it is that our freedom has a price. If that means drug. testing, so be it.
It's a price rm willing to pay." Student Drug-Testing Coalition, Student Drug-Testing Programs:
An Overview and Resource Guide 33 (2008).
.
225. GOLDING, supra note 199, at 292-93.
226. Support Our Law Enforcentent and Safe Neighborhood Ac~ S. 1070, 49th Leg.) 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2010).
227. State Question No. 755, OKLA. STATE QUESTIONS FOR GENERAL ELECTiON 1, 7 (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://www.ok.gov/elec.tions/documents/sq_genlO.pdf; Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (W.
D. Okla. 2010) (preliminary injunction against implementation of State Question_No. 755).
228. Gov. Mitch Daniels (R.-IN), Remarks on The Diane Rehm Show Concen1ing State Budgets and
Public Unions (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http:/lthedianerehmshow.orglshows/2011.-02-21/statebudgets-and-public.-unionsltranscript!
229. Deputy AG Under Review After "Live Ammunition" Tweet, tHEINDYCHANNEL.COM (Feb. 23,
20 ll ), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/26966614/detail.html.
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CAT'S CRADLE

Politicians and pundits have become immune to the ethics of war
rhetoric. The rhetoric itself is violent, and it breeds violence. The forty
years of the War on Drugs has demonstrated the success of militarized
rhetoric to move this nation to action. It does not suggest the success of the
war itself, but it demonstrated the power of the marketing tool. It allows
pundits and politicians to avoid responsibility by saying: "Everybody does
it._" The War on Drugs has datnaged the American culture and it has
damaged its democratic genius, the rule of law. But ultimately, it has made
acceptable the idea of being at war with each other.
As the parable of the War on Drugs has taught the people of this
nation, we will target specific enemies in the cause of an abstraction when
impelled by metaphorical militarized rhetoric. Those enemies will not be
protected by our rule of law. As these abstractions become less connected
to facts and pragmatism, metaphorical rhetoric acquires the tenor of actual
call to anns. The subtleties of the distinctions even if those - distinctions
exist are lost on the crowd that no longer recognizes the moral
implications of war. Left to its own ·devices to preserve itself, the crowd
will select enemies at random, targeting anybody who is not "us" to
preserve itself. Gabrielle Giffords was specifically targeted in this Culture
War. One can hardly argue that her shooting was coincidence or that
mental instability is an intervening cause. Today's pundits and politicians
. no longer have the moral sense to even see the connection.. Maybe that
blindness is the most horrifying result of the numbness we suffer from the
forty-year clrumbeat of the War on Drugs: "Regardless of how you try to
explain to people it's a 'war on drugs' or a 'war on a product,' people see a
231
war as a war on them.... We're not at war with people in this country."
During its ill-conceived and badly implemented forty-year life, the
War on Drugs has made victims of Americans' self-respect, their sense of
democracy, and their children. As originally marketed, this War would rid
-the nation's schools of drugs and drug users, thereby helping schools get
back to what they are designed to do educate children. No one doubts or
could credibly argue that drug use and schools do not mix. The problems.
with the War on Drugs were early apparent, making its longevity somewhat
•

•

•

230. "Perhaps, when we remetnber wars, we should take off our clothes and paint ourselves blue and
go on all fours all day long and grunt like pigs. That would surely be more appropriate than noble
oratory and shows of flags and well-oiled guns." KURT VONNEGUT, CAT'S CRADLE 254 (Dial
Press Trade Paperback 1991). Long popular with young adults, Cat's Cradle is among Kurt
Vonnegut's well-known anti-war novels.
231. Fieldst supra note 173, at A3 .
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of!! ·mystery. However, our ability to. embrace war as the solution to a
social policy and to ignore the moral ambiguities caused by such solution
arose from the casual way in which we accept militarized rhetoric as the
appropriate frame for the problem. In so accepting that pathos, we allowed
our goverlllltent to actually engage an enemy who could not fight back and
to tum their safe haven into a war zone. If we allow our own children to be
targeted, what stops people from declaring war on Members of Congress?
•

